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AT THE INTERSECTION OF APOLOGY AND SOVEREIGNTY

THE ARCTIC EXILE MONUMENT PROJECT

Pauline Wakeham

At the southern tip of Resolute Bay on Cornwallis Island, located in the northern reaches of the Arctic Archipelago, stands a sculpture of a lone Inuk man looking out toward the Arctic Ocean. Though the sculpture is a testament to endurance in the face of isolation, it also gestures toward the possibilities of reconnection with land, kin, and culture. For roughly four hundred kilometers farther north on Ellesmere Island, a second monument answers the first, depicting missing pieces of the Inuk's family—an Inuit woman and child similarly bracing against bitter winds and the sting of abandonment in an unknown place. Meant to be read together, as two parts of a whole, these sculptures collectively commemorate events that were first set in motion sixty years ago and that continue to reverberate in the Inuit hamlets of Resolute and Grise Fiord today. These two smallest and northernmost settlements in North America, with populations of just 229 and 141 residents respectively (Statistics Canada 2007b; 2007a), were not created by Inuit intent; rather, they were the product of what mid-century bureaucrats in Canada's Department of Resources and Development called a "pioneer experiment" (RCAP, 94) that exploited Inuit as test subjects for establishing settlements in the remote High Arctic,¹ a region Inuit had not "inhabited [for] centuries" (Byers, 109).² While this "experiment" was plagued from the outset by misinformation and poor planning, the aspect of its "inhumane . . . design" (RCAP, 162) that has become most contested is that of motive—what investigations have subsequently diagnosed as an entangled combination of mid-century Arctic colonization under the auspices of welfare state programs and a Cold War struggle for Arctic territorial control (Tester and Kulchyski, 9). The net result was that Inuit were coerced to leave their homelands, deserted in an alien environment more than 1,500

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kilometers farther north, and used as “human flagpoles” to bolster Canada’s sovereignty claims in the Queen Elizabeth Islands (114).³

The monuments at Resolute and Grise Fiord collectively commemorate what has become known as the High Arctic Relocations of 1953 and 1955. At the same time, the sculptures also signify Inuit ingenuity in an era of so-called reconciliation in Canada: they are the medium through which Inuit have waged their most recent effort to obtain a formal apology from the federal government for the relocations. The struggle for redress has been a long one, born of the rise of Inuit political consciousness and the establishment of Inuit political organizations in the 1970s and 1980s (RCAP, 34).⁴ As reconciliation has emerged as a dominant discourse shaping Indigenous–state relations over the past two and a half decades, Inuit have leveraged their currency to bring their particular experiences of colonial injustices to national attention. In 1987, under the leadership of Makivik Corporation, the Arctic Quebec land claim organization, an Inuit redress coalition submitted a position paper outlining its grievances to the federal government. Further investigations ensued and, in 1990, the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs filed a report recommending compensation and an apology, as did the Canadian Human Rights Commission in 1992. During the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) in the 1990s—arguably the first large-scale reconciliatory forum in Canada—Inuit leaders convinced RCAP to conduct its own detailed investigation into the High Arctic Relocations (RCAP, 4). RCAP collected testimony from relocatees and government employees, considered research by several academics, and published a report in 1994 that also advocated for reparations and an apology (163). In the face of public pressure, Prime Minister Jean Chrétien’s Liberal government negotiated a “Reconciliation Agreement” with Inuit survivors in 1996 that offered \$10 million in compensation but adamantly withheld an apology. Aging relocatees, seeking some measure of redress in their lifetime, signed the agreement “under duress” (Byers, 110).

Twelve years later, in the wake of Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s highly publicized 2008 residential schools apology and the commencement of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission particular to that colonial policy, Inuit renewed their calls for the apology they had previously been denied.⁵ Rather than waiting for the government to answer, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated (NTI)—the Inuit organization

responsible for ensuring that both the spirit and the letter of the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement are fulfilled—initiated the Arctic Exile Monument Project in an effort to bring the relocations to national awareness and “to gain an apology from the federal government (NTI 2009).⁶ As the monuments neared completion in the summer of 2010, NTI planned the unveiling ceremonies and invited media and government officials, effectively leveraging the possibility of bad press to pressure the government into presenting an apology (Amagoalik). The strategy yielded results: on August 18, 2010, Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs John Duncan traveled to Inukjuak, the original homeland of many relocatees, to deliver the long-awaited *mea culpa*. Shortly thereafter, on September 8 and 10, Duncan attended the sculpture unveilings in Resolute and Grise Fiord and presented framed copies of the apology to each community.⁷

As much as the apology constituted a triumph for Inuit, that victory was an uneasy one. This is because the Canadian state’s reconciliatory gestures operate according to a logic of “affirmative repair” that “offers only surface forms of recognition” or limited “symbolic and material disbursements . . . directed toward affirming the prevailing social order” (Woolford, 432). The 2010 apology for the High Arctic Relocations constitutes an important case study for examining this affirmative logic because the specific history of the relocations and the recent context of their “reconciling” bring the discourses of apology and settler-state sovereignty into explicit intersection in particularly striking ways. This essay examines how both the original human rights violation and the subsequent apology for that injury are entangled in the assertion of settler-state sovereignty: while the 1953 and 1955 relocations were spurred by the Cold War scramble for Arctic control, the 2010 apology, though precipitated by astute Inuit lobbying, was transformed by the government into an opportunity to reassert Canada’s Arctic claims in an era of global warming that is rendering the region a renewed site of international interest. Through this stunning symmetry of agendas, the case of the High Arctic Relocations throws into relief the ways that settler-state apologies may be mobilized to manage unruly histories of colonial violence and to augment settler-state sovereignty.

My contention regarding the affirmative articulation of apology and sovereignty might sound counterintuitive: the proffering of reconciliatory gestures for colonial injustices by a settler state—especially

injustices connected to the exploitation of Indigenous peoples as “human flagpoles”—would seem to risk exposing the illegitimacies of settler territorial control. And yet, Minister Duncan’s *mea culpa* for the High Arctic Relocations naturalizes Canada’s Arctic claims via what I call the “apologetics” of settler sovereignty. Etymologically derived from the Greek *apologyia*, “a defense or speech in defense” (qtd. in Tavuchis, 15–16), the noun “apologetic” is accorded two primary meanings by the Oxford English Dictionary: a “formal apology for, or defence of, a person, doctrine, course of action, etc.” and “the defensive method of argument” (OED). Nicholas Tavuchis contends that a “connotative displacement and transformation” has occurred in “modern” times, shifting the meaning of “apology” and “apologetic” away from their etymological connections to the concept of “defense” and toward a “declaration . . . that one has *no* excuse, defense, justification, or explanation for an action . . . that has wronged another” (17). While Tavuchis is quick to insist on a complete “connotative displacement,” I suggest that the Greek root *apologyia* that inextricably connects “apology” and “defense” continues to inform the uses to which public apologies are put. More specifically, the apologetics of settler sovereignty—a cluster of discursive, symbolic, and performative practices of purported colonial recompense—work to transform reconciliation into a *defense* of settler-state authority and sovereignty. To suggest that these apologetics defend settler-state sovereignty, however, is not to imply that they operate solely *on the defensive*, or through reactive crisis management strategies that rigidly delimit injuries and mitigate culpability. While this dimension is certainly operative, it is also complemented by “positive” elements whereby the performative and affective dynamics of apologetics endow the state with the moral authority to lead the nation forward in renewed relations. Under the guise of a reparative recognition of Indigenous “contributions” to the nation, these apologetics often issue a coercive imperative of social cohesion that may overwrite Indigenous sovereignty, suppress Indigenous dissent, and assimilate Indigenous peoples deeper into the nation’s fold.

Despite the fraught status of settler apologetics, Inuit persistence to obtain a *mea culpa* after it had been so adamantly denied in 1996 suggests that reconciliation’s symbolic components (rather than solely financial compensation) continue to hold importance for many, though not necessarily all, Inuit. While some scholars have critiqued settler-state

apologies as “hollow, symbolic gestures” that “engage in a ‘politics of distraction,’” thereby shifting attention “away from [the] restitution of indigenous homelands and resources” (Corntasel and Holder, 467, 472), a case study of the Inuit movement for an apology and the resultant 2010 *mea culpa* complicates such analyses. It does so by revealing that symbolic gestures of reconciliation are far from “hollow.” In other words, settler-state apologies do much more than “distract” from the vital necessity of the restitution of Indigenous lands; they legitimize state power to further encroach upon Indigenous rights, territories, and resources under the banner of national progress and its pillars of economic and political security. And yet, in the midst of this precarious terrain, the Arctic Exile Monument Project not only suggests Inuit demand for the symbolic gesture of apology; the project also mobilizes symbolic works of its own both to summon the *mea culpa* into being and to contest its limits. Intervening in this zone of struggle between the call for an apology and the fraught effects of its specific content and delivery, the Monument Project carves out a space for asserting Inuit perspectives on the High Arctic Relocations and their implications for Arctic sovereignty. In this context, the sculptures at Resolute and Grise Fiord necessitate thick analyses of the vital interplay between the ostensibly “soft” domain of cultural politics and the “hard” sphere of state geopolitics and sovereignty-claiming.

Throughout this essay, I put into critical practice an articulated reading strategy that attends to the affinities and tensions between the settler state’s *mea culpa* and the Inuit’s own statement of injustice and resurgence. More specifically, I analyze how the deployment of sculpture as a rejoinder to the apology summons the little-known but intricately entangled histories of the High Arctic Relocations and the state’s management of an Inuit art industry, prompting consideration of the way that both Inuit bodies and Inuit aesthetics have been coopted in the service of bolstering Canadian Arctic sovereignty. At the same time, the monuments at Resolute and Grise Fiord reclaim sculpture not as a static form of Inuit authenticity, but as a complex medium of Inuit social and political expression that speaks back to, and also beyond, settler apologetics. In this context, the Monument Project materializes practices of restorative place-making in the aftermath of colonial displacement that transform alienation into the basis of an ethical relationship with the land. In its very making or “doing,” therefore, the

Monument Project enacts a form of Inuit sovereignty resilient enough to challenge settler-state cooptation and assert the primacy of Inuit land rights in the wake of colonial exile.

MAKING CITIZENS / MAKING EXILES

To better understand recent events surrounding the 2010 apology, it is crucial to first travel further back in time to when and where the federal government's "experiment" in exile began. If Inukjuak, the Inuktitut name for a settlement that colonial officials once called Port Harrison, is recognizable to people beyond Arctic Canada, it is often due to its status as the place where Robert Flaherty filmed his 1922 ethnographic portrayal of imagined Inuit primitivism, *Nanook of the North*. For many Inuit, however, Inukjuak resonates very differently as a lost homeland and a site of separation from missing kin. This is because Inukjuak was ground zero for the High Arctic Relocations. The project was launched in July 1953, when seven Inuit families, including Flaherty's unacknowledged offspring, left their community on the northeastern rim of Hudson Bay and boarded an Arctic patrol vessel, the *C. D. Howe*.⁸ During a harrowing journey through ice-riddled sea channels, the ship gathered three additional Inuit families at Pond Inlet on Baffin Island before it arrived at its destinations roughly 1,500 kilometers north of where the voyage began. Two summers later, an additional four families from Inukjuak and two from Pond Inlet were enlisted in the same migration, increasing the number of relocatees living on the Queen Elizabeth Islands to a total of ninety-two—the only Inuit and the only civilian population to be found in this region at mid-century (RCAP, 7–8).⁹

Although government officials of the period often described the relocatees as "volunteers," the methods by which Inuit were chosen for this project fell devastatingly short of the requirements of free and informed consent (RCAP, 141). Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) officers tended to select Inuit and notify them of the decision—an act many interpreted as a directive rather than an invitation due to the RCMP's status as the embodiment of colonial authority in the Arctic (Tester and Kulchyski, 140; Marcus, 79–80). Cognizant of this power, Henry Larsen, a commanding officer for the RCMP, remarked that "the Eskimos being a simple people [are] in the habit of doing almost

anything any white man will tell them to do" (qtd. in Marcus, 80). Despite the physical challenges posed by the arduous process of establishing new camps in unfamiliar terrain, the RCMP selected several Inuit unsuited for relocation, including Sarah Amagoalik, eight months pregnant at the time of the *C. D. Howe's* departure; Nellie Amagoalik, an eighty-year-old woman; Anna Nungaq, a disabled woman who "had to be carried on board" the ship; and a three-month-old infant (Marcus, 81). The problems of the coercive selection process were compounded by the misinformation supplied to Inuit. As the Royal Commission's report avers, "Securing Inuit participation in the relocation depended on *not* disclosing . . . the true character" of the plan (RCAP, 75). Instead, relocatees were plied with recruitment fables of a promised land teeming with big game for hunting (82). The relocatees were also led to believe that they would collectively move to a single location and that, if unhappy, they could return home in one year (Tester and Kulchyski, 141).

The realities of the relocations proved entirely different. Once aboard the Arctic patrol vessel, the Inukjuamiut were surprised to learn that families from Pond Inlet, many of whom spoke a different dialect of Inuktitut, would be joining them. Moreover, close friends and kin were divided between two sites—Resolute on Cornwallis Island and Grise Fiord on Ellesmere Island four hundred kilometers farther north (RCAP, 85).¹⁰ Abandoned on these desolate shores, the Inukjuamiut found themselves stranded in an alien terrain of extreme cold where darkness reigned for long portions of the year (RCAP, 93). As Makivik Corporation noted in its 1987 report, "Unlike Inukjuak where the summer is approximately three and one-half . . . months in duration, summer in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay is no more than a period of six . . . weeks. Unlike Inukjuak, in Grise Fiord and Resolute Bay there is no daylight from the month of October through to the month of February" (Government of Canada, 22A: 54).¹¹ While Pond Inlet Inuit had been recruited to help the Inukjuak families adjust to High Arctic conditions, they too suffered in the isolated environment, as all relocatees were separated from their kinship networks and left with only thin canvas tents for shelter, insufficient clothing for extreme Arctic weather, and limited food staples (RCAP, 87–88). Big game turned out to be scarce while the details of federal conservation regulations, withheld from the relocatees until their arrival in the High Arctic, banned the hunting of musk

ox and restricted the hunting of caribou, leaving relocatees on the brink of starvation (87–89).¹² Despite these hardships, repeated requests to return home were opposed by the RCMP and prevented by the denial of federal assistance until 1987. As a result, the relocatees were rendered “virtual prisoners in the High Arctic,” living in a state of exile for decades (1).

The Government of Canada has repeatedly characterized the High Arctic Relocations as a beneficent attempt to address acute socioeconomic problems in Inukjuak. In response to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs’ 1990 recommendation of compensation and an apology to the relocatees, then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Tom Siddon argued that “the decisions by the federal government, in the early 1950s, appears [*sic*] to have been solely related to improving the harsh social and economic conditions facing the Inuit at Inukjuak at that time” (qtd. in Tester and Kulchyski, 102). The historical context surrounding the relocations, however, is more complex than Siddon’s statement would admit. Many scholars have demonstrated that the “crisis” in Inukjuak, described as one of overpopulation and the threat of starvation, was not the dire reality that some bureaucrats claimed it to be. In 1951 and 1952, the years immediately prior to the relocations, socioeconomic circumstances in Inukjuak were reported by government officials as “not unsatisfactory to any extent,” with significant wildlife for hunting and an increased income from furs and handicrafts (qtd. in RCAP, 76, 62; Damas, 53).¹³ Additionally, the variety of birds, fish, and land mammals available as food sources far exceeded the limited diet of sea mammals available at Resolute and Grise Fiord (Marcus, 109–10). Thus, as Michael Byers has asked, “if the interests of the Inuit were paramount, why move people more than 1,500 km northward to a High Arctic desert that bore little resemblance to their home?” (110). Why, moreover, send Inuit—some of whom were elderly or infirm—to locations far from medical assistance and where no surveys had been conducted regarding wildlife availability? (Marcus, 109–10). The government’s narrative of exigent rescue does not cohere with the fact that relocation exposed Inuit to far greater risk and suffering than they were experiencing in their own homelands.

The answer to Byers’s question, many scholars contend, is that of an alternate agenda. Substantial historical evidence demonstrates that the impetus for the relocations hinged, in both indirect and deliberate

ways, on Canada's efforts to solidify its claim to Arctic sovereignty in the face of perceived threats.¹⁴ Although Arctic territorial control was a longstanding concern of the federal government for most of the twentieth century, the preoccupation peaked in the postwar period due to heightened international military and commercial focus on the Arctic and, most significantly, the United States' Cold War incursions into the region. Fearing that Soviet powers might launch an Arctic offensive, the United States intensified its development of military bases and personnel in the region and, with Canadian permission, "built and operated" on Canadian territory forty-two satellite stations as part of the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line (Bonesteel, 14). This heightened U.S. presence and the "American refusal to clearly recognize Canadian claims" to the Arctic Archipelago became a pressing concern for the federal government (Tester and Kulchyski, 124). Between 1950 and 1952 a cluster of incidents further heightened Canadian anxieties. For example, in 1952 the American Air Force used the Canadian air base at Alert on Ellesmere Island before receiving authorization from Canada (Marcus, 56; Tester and Kulchyski, 127). Also in that year the U.S. Air Force attempted to prohibit a Royal Canadian Air Force plane from conducting an aerial photography survey of Baffin Island, and also attempted to prevent the *C. D. Howe* from landing at Padloping Island, territory long claimed by Canada (Marcus, 56; Tester and Kulchyski, 127). To counter such encroachments, the Canadian government recognized that its *de jure* sovereignty, or legal "title to territory," needed to be more demonstrably "consolidated and maintained," according to the principles of international law, by an intensified practice of *de facto* sovereignty—the exercise of regular governmental activity and "use and occupation" of the region (Byers, 25).

To enhance its *de facto* presence in the Arctic, the Canadian government began to extend its welfare state programs northward. Before the mid-twentieth century, the federal government had largely disregarded Inuit, signing no treaties with this Indigenous group and yet subsuming their land into the nation-state's boundaries while leaving the Arctic to informal colonization by missionaries and the Hudson's Bay Company. Additionally, Inuit had been overlooked during the drafting of the Indian Act in 1876 and, hence, for most of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, were caught in a state of legal limbo as

a marginalized group that was denied the full rights of citizenship, on the one hand, as well as the fiduciary obligations owed by the state to status Indians, on the other.¹⁵ During World War II, U.S. military officers stationed throughout the Canadian Arctic began to vocalize disapproval of Inuit living conditions and staggering mortality rates across the region (Bonesteel, 10; RCAP, 39). Prompted by public criticism and recognition that “Inuit were virtually the only Canadian citizens living in one-third of Canada’s territory” that could counterbalance the “large numbers of American military personnel,” the Liberal government of the period quickly altered this longstanding pattern of neglect (Marcus, 4). Fledgling schools and medical stations were established in a few Arctic settlements and old age pensions began to be distributed to Inuit. The granting of family allowances to Inuit in 1945 constituted a form of public recognition, “for the first time,” of Inuit as “citizens of the Dominion” (Duffy qtd. in Bonesteel, 7). The northward extension of the welfare state consequently became a method of claiming Inuit and, hence, their inhabitation of the Arctic for Canada.

The promise of citizenship inclusion for Inuit, however, took the shape of colonial paternalism in practice: although family allowances were provided to non-Indigenous Canadians in the form of routine cash payments, these funds were doled out to Inuit in a strictly regulated process administered by trading posts and the RCMP—Arctic agents operating under government orders to provide allowances only in times of scarcity and only in the form of supplies deemed of necessity to families (Tester and Kulchyski, 80–81). These regulations demonstrate the ambivalence in bureaucrats’ attitudes during this period, vacillating between an anxious need to govern Inuit in the face of heightened international Arctic presence, and trepidation of the fiscal expense of providing welfare programs to Inuit. This fear of rising costs was fueled by the worst colonial stereotypes of native indolence and the belief that the comforts of civilization would corrupt Inuit self-reliance and encourage dependency on government aid (Tester and Kulchyski, 54; Marcus, 24). Inukjuak became a focal point for such anxieties, as the existence of the Hudson’s Bay trading post and the establishment of a school and nursing station resulted in an increased number of Inuit in the region, many of whom had been influenced by the fur industry to abandon their subsistence hunting practices and

operate traplines instead. With the collapse of the white fox fur market in the late 1940s, the primary source of income for many Inuit was devastated and people turned to government relief for survival (RCAP, 47; Marcus, 37). To lessen the burden of rising relief costs, bureaucrats devised a plan to move Inuit away from Inukjuak and return them to an ostensibly rehabilitative state of nature—remote locations devoid of social services where Inuit would be compelled to reprise their traditional methods of living off the land.

While the provision of social services to the Inukjuamiut who remained in Arctic Quebec offered one form of evidence of *de facto* Canadian sovereignty, additional methods were required farther north in the least inhabited parts of the Arctic Archipelago. In order to ameliorate its occupation of this region, the RCMP reopened stations at Craig Harbour and Alexandra Fiord on Ellesmere Island (Marcus, 55). The most vital way to trump American military presence, however, was the establishment of a Canadian civilian population in the Queen Elizabeth Islands. As Diamond Jenness, chief of anthropology at the National Museum of Canada, asserted in a 1945 lecture,

There can be no doubt that Canada would immensely strengthen her claim to sovereignty over the uninhabited islands in her Arctic sector if she established . . . Eskimo settlements [there]. . . I say Eskimo settlements, not settlements of white men, because no ordinary white man is content to make his home . . . where medical, educational, and other facilities are either non-existent or totally inadequate. The Eskimos, on the other hand (whether from ignorance or not, makes no difference) prefer their Arctic home to any other and will gladly settle in any part of it." (qtd. in Tester and Kulchyski, 111–12)

The High Arctic Relocations, therefore, solved two problems at once: decreasing Inuit reliance on government welfare while also populating the Queen Elizabeth Islands (Tester and Kulchyski, 9). An Indigenous group that had been largely cast aside was consequently reclaimed as Canadian citizens even as their fundamental rights as such were violated by their exploitation in a Cold War territorial contest. This mid-century cooptation of Inuit as citizens for the benefit of the settler state's Arctic sovereignty claims foreshadows the renewed assimilation of Inuit into the nation's fold in the current moment of reconciliation, to which I now turn.

OF APOLOGETICS AND ALIBIS

The question of sovereignty is the specter that haunts both the High Arctic Relocations and the subsequent struggles over state recognition of and redress for these events. Sovereignty is the motive that would transform this forced displacement from a so-called humanitarian intervention into a gross human rights violation. For if Inuit were moved to remote locations in extreme High Arctic environments not because conditions in Inukjuak were as dire as the government has claimed, but because the settler state exploited Inuit as pawns in a scramble to secure control of the Queen Elizabeth Islands, then the problems of coercion, lack of informed consent, and the suffering that relocatees endured could not be so easily discounted as unfortunate failings of a well-intentioned government program. For this reason, it is important to delve deeper into the Canadian government's 1996 and 2010 declarations regarding the High Arctic Relocations and examine how the government's reconciliatory discourse attempts to manage the unruly specter of sovereignty.

In 1996 when Jean Chrétien's Liberal administration sought to appease public calls for an apology and compensation, they did so by bypassing a *mea culpa* and rerouting reconciliation through a legal Memorandum of Agreement, referred to as a reconciliation agreement. In carefully chosen language, the document offers two items of acknowledgment as a reconciliatory gesture: "Canada hereby recognizes and acknowledges that . . . in part because of government planning and implementation of the relocations, the High Arctic Relocatees encountered hardship, suffering and loss in the initial years of these relocations," and that the "Relocatees contributed to a Canadian presence in the High Arctic" ("Memorandum," 2). In the act of purportedly acknowledging the relocations' injurious effects, the memorandum temporally delimits suffering to the "initial years," thereby overwriting the long-term hardships of separation from kin and lost economic, social, and educational opportunities that Inuit in Resolute and Grise Fiord continue to experience to this day. Government liability is also diffused by the implication that although the relocatees' suffering may be relatable "in part" to "government planning and implementation," the causes of that hardship are more dispersed and difficult to trace. To

add weight to these acknowledgments, the document also outlines compensation in the form of an \$8 million trust fund and \$2 million in initial payments to the fifty-five living survivors and descendants of those who had passed away.

For the price of \$10 million, therefore, Chrétien's Liberals purchased contractual assurance that the relocatees must "release and discharge" the Government of Canada "from any claim and all manner of actions and from any obligation or liability in regard to the matters provided for in the settlement agreement" ("Memorandum," 12). Federal officials also insisted that the memorandum include the following statement: "The High Arctic Relocatees and Makivik Corporation hereby recognize and acknowledge that in planning the relocation to the High Arctic the government officials of the time were acting with honourable intentions in what was perceived to be in the best interests of the Inuit" (2). Not only did this statement implicitly deny the sovereignty motive behind the relocations, it also articulated that denial through the ventriloquized voice of the relocatees—all of whom, the government's news release emphasized, "signed the reconciliation agreement" (Department of Indian Affairs). In this way, the memorandum transformed a contractual concession into a validation by the injured parties of the government's good intentions. The Memorandum of Agreement also required the relocatees to sign a statement confirming that the "settlement agreement . . . is satisfactory and that it adequately finalizes the reconciliation between myself and Canada" ("Memorandum," 12). Announcing the deal in a news release with the headline "High Arctic Inuit Relocation Reconciled," then Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development Ron Irwin asserted that the settlement brought "this matter with the Inuit to a final conclusion" (Department of Indian Affairs).

Despite these attempts to impose closure on the High Arctic Relocations, Inuit demands for an apology continued and, in the wake of the 2008 residential schools apology, resurfaced with new momentum. The pursuit of an official apology was most likely motivated by multiple factors, including the desire to have Inuit injustices recognized the way that other colonial harms in Canada have recently been.¹⁶ As John Amagoalik, a former relocatee and a leader of the redress movement, has put it, "when the apology for the residential schools occurred . . . we reminded the government that we also have unfinished

business" (Amagoalik). Additionally, for many Inuit, the campaign for the 2010 *mea culpa* sought to redress not only the original relocations of the 1950s but also the compounded injuries incurred by the 1996 reconciliation agreement. As Member of Parliament Ray Skelly presciently remarked during the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs' 1990 investigation, "Canada has a very bad record with its aboriginal people. And its very bad record is not only in its treatment but also in its redress" (Government of Canada, 22:5). Lobbying the state to present the apology it had adamantly withheld since 1996 thus constituted a challenge to the power asymmetries structuring dominant reconciliatory frameworks.

Although the attainment of an apology for the High Arctic Relocations is a significant achievement in strategic lobbying for Inuit, comparative analysis of the 1996 memorandum and the 2010 *mea culpa* reveals that the government's troubled record of redress persists in its latest attempt to, in the words of Minister Duncan, "turn the page on this sad chapter in Canada's history" (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). Though the turn to apology might appear to signal a more repentant admission of government wrongdoing, this shift in genre is, instead, part of an effort to manage redress claims by enlisting the affective and performative force of apology. Beneath the transformation in form from the 1996 legal memorandum to the 2010 apology, the content of both reconciliatory gestures remains strikingly similar. The 2010 statement does offer a more detailed accounting of the "extreme hardship and suffering" experienced by the relocatees, itemizing the separation from "home communities and extended families," the distance and difference between Inukjuak and the Queen Elizabeth Islands, the division of relocatees between two sites, and the government's failure "to act on its promise to return anyone that did not wish to stay in the High Arctic" (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). However, the statement continues to carefully delimit and to mitigate government responsibility. For example, in the explicit moment of apologetic utterance, Minister Duncan asserts: "The Government of Canada deeply regrets the mistakes and broken promises of this dark chapter of our history and apologizes for the High Arctic relocation having taken place" (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). Here, the statement employs the passive voice to depict the relocations as occurring—or "taking place"—without clear origins or agents. Likewise, the expressed regret is not linked to particular

state actions; instead, it is connected to events that have unfolded in some vague relation to “mistakes” that are not explicitly attributed to an actor or acknowledged as agential decisions, thereby diffusing government responsibility for displacing Inuit.

Most crucially, the sovereignty motive for the relocations remains persistently occluded in the 2010 apology. While the rationale for moving Inuit to the High Arctic remains unaddressed in the *mea culpa* itself, in the “Backgrounder” accompanying Minister Duncan’s statement on the Department of Aboriginal Affairs’ website, the relocations are briefly explained as a government intervention in the face of “deteriorating traditional harvesting, health, and social conditions in Inukjuak”—references that support the government’s past justifications of the relocations as a beneficent rescue effort (Aboriginal Affairs 2010b). By shifting the question of motive to a “Backgrounder” that was not included in the performance of apology itself, the government quietly supplements the *mea culpa* with the reaffirmed master narrative of humanitarian intervention. Both the 1996 reconciliation agreement and the 2010 apology therefore sidestep the sovereignty agenda that catalyzed the relocations while rerouting the specter of sovereignty into a concessionary acknowledgment of what, to recall, the 1996 memorandum describes as “the High Arctic Relocatees’ contrib[ution] to a Canadian presence in the High Arctic” (“Memorandum,” 2). The 2010 apology echoes the 1996 wording almost verbatim, asserting that the “communities [of Resolute and Grise Fiord] have contributed to a strong Canadian presence in the High Arctic” (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). These recognitions substitute the word “sovereignty” with a more tepid reference to “presence,” while making the effects of that “presence” seem like an accidental by-product of the relocations rather than a key motivating factor. Thus, without explicitly invoking the word “sovereignty,” the reconciliation agreement and *mea culpa* both strategically transform an exploitative rationale that would irrefutably mark the relocations as a human rights abuse into an ostensibly benevolent recognition of Inuit “contributions.” Such rhetoric converts forced displacement into a willing offering that suggests the relocatees’ voluntary participation. The word “contributions” also diminishes the role played by the Inuit relocatees in inhabiting the High Arctic as but one of supposedly many elements of Canadian “use and occupation” of the region.

Under the semblance of a reparative recognition, the acknowledgment of Inuit “contributions” to “Canadian presence in the High Arctic” in both the 1996 memorandum and the 2010 apology implicitly enfolds Inuit within a homogenizing national body politic. Such a purportedly inclusive gesture has strategic advantages. First, it eclipses the history of the liminal legal status of Inuit in Canada as an Indigenous population that was denied the full rights of citizenship and was subject to colonial management. Second, in the very act of acknowledging Inuit “contributions” and reclaiming Inuit as Canadian citizens, the apology forecloses any possibility that Inuit presence in the High Arctic would confirm *Inuit* rather than *Canadian* territorial rights and sovereignty by subsuming the former within the totalizing fold of the latter. Both the reconciliation agreement and the subsequent apology thus discursively appropriate Inuit land and bodies while framing that appropriation as a reparative recognition.

Despite the fact that there is little difference in the content articulated in the 1996 memorandum and the 2010 apology, the federal government has presented the apology as a new and significant “step towards healing and reconciliation” (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). What produces the semblance of reconciliatory progress is the shift in genre from a legal document to an apology and the particular affective dynamics the latter enables. While a legal memorandum mobilizes a form of detached textual inscription, late modern collective apologies operate as performative utterances that attribute “the features of the liberal individual” to states, thereby phantasmatically transforming a heterogeneous assemblage of institutional apparatuses into a feeling entity that can ostensibly recognize and respond to the pain of others (Trouillot, 185).¹⁷ This is precisely the kind of magic that Minister Duncan’s speech attempted to perform when he asserted: “On behalf of the Government of Canada . . . we would like to express our deepest sorrow for the extreme hardship and suffering caused by the relocation” (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). It is important to note that the apology never invokes the word “sorry,” but instead substitutes that crucial word with “sorrow.” Instead of *being sorry*, the state claims to *feel sorrow for* the pain and suffering of Inuit, thereby converting the *mea culpa* into a statement not of confession but of commiseration that distances the state from its role as perpetrator. As Trouillot observes, such a “rhetoric of sharing pain . . . obscures relations of power within the national

imaginary" (184) and consequently masks the state's responsibility to address the structural problems that created the conditions for injustice. This distancing of the state from the perpetration of harm paradoxically enables "an experience of intimacy—intimate holding, intimate understanding, intimate knowledge between those who control access to and those excluded from critical rights" (Povinelli, 183). Such a "fantasy of . . . reparation" consequently seeks to "bind oppressed groups more tightly to the state" even as this binding, this closeness, augments the power imbalances that underpin oppression (183).

The affective labor of Minister Duncan's 2010 statement is a crucial component of the apologetics of settler sovereignty. In producing the state as a compassionate entity that feels the suffering of its citizens, the *mea culpa* repairs the state's moral authority and sovereign right to renew the project of nation-building and enlist Inuit with a call to patriotic duty: "We must continue to strengthen our connections and deepen our understanding and respect. We must jointly build . . . a stronger, healthier and more vibrant Canada. . . . May . . . [this apology] strengthen the foundation upon which the Government of Canada and Inuit can build and help keep the True North Strong and Free" (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). By painting a patriotic vision of shared homelands, capped off with a reference to the national anthem's settler fantasy of northern indigenization, the apology attempts to overwrite Inuit sovereignty and to interpellate Inuit as "partners" in Canadian nation-building. Although, as we have seen, the same discursive enfolding of Inuit lands and communities into the settler nation is inscribed in the terse legalese of the 1996 memorandum, the 2010 apology's use of a new rhetoric of "partnership" and a call to Inuit patriotic commitment endows the *mea culpa* with a particular force of emotive persuasion. Although Minister Duncan's preface to his expression of "sorrow" is articulated as a polite request—"please accept the apology I am about to offer"—the reconciliatory imperative encoded in the *mea culpa* frames Inuit "acceptance" of the state's terms for rapprochement as a moral obligation (Aboriginal Affairs 2010a). By extension, the pursuit of further redress claims, the voicing of political dissent, and the assertion of Inuit sovereignty are tacitly construed as disruptive to national healing.

If the Monument Project forced the government's hand into presenting the apology, bureaucrats sought to reclaim that moment not

only through the performative tactics employed in Duncan's speech but also via the strategic timetabling of a second press event that converged with the apology. On August 20, 2010, just two days after Duncan's mea culpa, Minister of Foreign Affairs Lawrence Cannon released a *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad*—the Canadian government's first ever stand-alone statement regarding its foreign policy for the Arctic. The report systematically outlines the historical basis and contemporary exercise of Canadian Arctic sovereignty and presents a comprehensive program for Canadian leadership in the international Arctic arena.¹⁸ The document affirms that "our sovereignty over Canadian Arctic lands, including islands, is undisputed—with the single exception of Hans Island, a 1.3-square-kilometre Canadian island which Denmark claims" (Department of Foreign Affairs 2010b, 6). Additionally, the document outlines Canada's outstanding maritime boundary "disagreements" with Denmark and the United States and declares its intent to "secure international recognition for the full extent of our extended continental shelf" crucial for claims to oil and gas resources (7). As Minister Cannon asserted at a press conference announcing the report's launch, "Interest in the Arctic has never been greater and this has critical implications for Canada. . . . It is especially important that Canada, as a significant Arctic power, make a clear statement about our Arctic foreign policy priorities and objectives as we prepare to assume the chair of the Arctic Council in 2013" (Department of Foreign Affairs 2010a). The creation of such a document in the current moment speaks volumes about Canada's reignited assertion of Arctic sovereignty in an era of global warming in which the melting of multi-year ice is rendering the region increasingly accessible to maritime vessels and the exploitation of what is estimated to be "13 percent of the world's undiscovered oil reserves, and 30% percent of undiscovered gas deposits" ("Arctic Council Grants"). International interest is so great that China, India, Italy, Japan, Korea, and Singapore—nation-states located nowhere near the Arctic region—have applied for and recently been granted observer status at the Arctic Council.

By coordinating the launch of the *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy* with the apology for the High Arctic Relocations, the two events became conjoined in a public relations campaign promoting settler-state sovereignty. The document further intensifies the appropriative

strategies articulated in the apology, asserting that “Canada’s Arctic sovereignty is long-standing, well established and based on historic title, founded in part on the presence of Inuit and other Indigenous peoples since time immemorial” (Department of Foreign Affairs 2010b, 4). Although Indigenous claims to inhabiting Turtle Island “since time immemorial” are typically undermined by the government, treated as myth rather than fact, and overwritten by multicultural credos that define Canada as a “nation of immigrants,” here the state ceremoniously reclaims this phrase to count Inuit Arctic occupation as evidence of settler-state sovereignty. This fantasy of national indigenization was quickly transformed into political theater as Prime Minister Harper promptly commenced his annual northern tour on August 23, 2010, travelling to Resolute to observe Operation Nanook—what the foreign policy statement describes as the Canadian Forces’ “annual [Arctic] sovereignty operation . . . demonstrating control over the air, land and sea within our jurisdiction” (6). The 2010 iteration of Operation Nanook was unprecedented in scale as, for the first time, the operation involved “collaboration with the United States and Denmark in order to increase interoperability and exercise a collective response to emerging cross-border challenges” (6). In so doing, Canada sought to position itself as an international leader in Arctic security while also naturalizing its authority to do so via recourse to a mythologized emblem of Inuit Arctic life—that of *Nanook of the North*—coopted as a branding device for Canadian sovereignty.

Over the last century, the federal government has repeatedly appropriated Inuit “presence” in the Arctic as evidence of de facto Canadian sovereignty.¹⁹ In the past, such cooptation of Inuit inhabitation has been nonconsultative. In Canada’s current culture of reconciliation, however, the performance of apology has enabled arguably even more problematic forms of colonial appropriation. While both the 1996 reconciliation agreement and the 2010 official apology elide Inuit sovereignty through the purported reparative recognition of Inuit “contributions” to Canada, the apology’s incitement to forging new partnerships in a collaborative nation-building process manufactures an illusion of progressive consultation and consent that implies Inuit endorsement of the federal government’s Arctic agenda. By repairing Canada’s image as a model liberal democracy working in tandem with Indigenous peoples, Duncan’s *mea culpa* thus laid crucial groundwork for the foreign

policy statement's celebratory enlistment of longstanding Inuit Arctic inhabitation as legal evidence of Canada's territorial claim.

SCULPTURE'S SOVEREIGN INSCRIPTIONS

Depending on one's perspective, the Arctic Exile Monument Project might initially appear to complement rather than challenge the state's narrative of reconciliation and its techniques for addressing colonial injustices through the deployment of symbolic gestures. Key to the reigning Conservatives' approach is the instrumentalized use of culture and the arts to quell calls for redress with "pacifying routines of bureaucratic commemoration . . . and monument unveilings" (James 2013, 41–42). Such "state-driven" commemorative initiatives seek to relegate injustices to a "sanitized field of official remembrance" and, thus, to "discipline, narrow, and contain . . . reparation struggles" by preventing articulations between so-called historical injustices and ongoing structural oppression (41, 36, 42).²⁰ As a striking case in point, upon announcing the commissioning of a stained glass window to commemorate residential schools in the federal Parliament buildings, Minister Duncan asserted that the residential school system was not genocide but an "education policy gone wrong" ("Saganash"). Although the Arctic Exile Monument Project's use of sculptures to pay tribute to the High Arctic Relocations might risk misrecognition as yet another example of "bureaucratic commemoration," the sculptures instead produce a complex mirroring effect, one that refracts and destabilizes state models, thereby reorienting the symbolic terrain of reconciliation. The Monument Project is not a state-sponsored commemorative initiative; it is an Inuit-conceptualized and Inuit-sponsored project mobilized not to conclude a reconciliation process and institutionalize strategic forgetting but, rather, to reignite Inuit lobbying for redress. Instead of allowing Minister Duncan's apologetics to stand as the final word on the relocations, the sculptures continue to speak in the *mea culpa's* wake, catalyzing active remembering of the past and renewed assertions of Inuit rights in the present.

But how does the Monument Project speak and what, specifically, does it say? If the project's message was confined to the commemorative plaques affixed beside the sculptures at Resolute and Grise Fiord,

then the answer might once again misrecognize the project's complex work. For the message inscribed on both plaques, scripted collaboratively by members of the Monument Project committee, bears a certain resemblance to the government's apologetic discourse. Specifically, the plaques state, "In memory of Inuit who landed here in 1953 and 1955, and those who came after. They came to these desolate shores to pursue the Government's promise of a more prosperous life. They endured and overcame great hardship, and dedicated their lives to Canada's sovereignty in these lands and waters." The resonances between the plaques' affirmation that the relocatees "dedicated their lives to Canada's sovereignty" and the apology's recognition that the relocatees have "contributed to a strong Canadian presence in the High Arctic" might suggest that the mea culpa's hailing of Inuit as assimilated national subjects was successful. But, rather than constituting an acquiescent response to the apology's interpellative call, the scripting of the plaques actively preceded and precipitated Duncan's statement. This temporal reversal of the normative reconciliatory contract in which the state presents an apology to an aggrieved constituency and, in so doing, demands from the recipients appropriately forgiving behavior suggests that the Monument Project's plaques need to be read as something more than a straightforward acceptance of settler-state discourse. Although the inscriptions on the plaques do incorporate some of the idioms of official commemorative discourse, they also invoke the word that was deliberately absent in both the 1996 reconciliation agreement and the 2010 mea culpa: namely, sovereignty. By speaking this word, the Monument Project affirms the connection between the relocations and their significant role in substantiating Canadian use and occupation of the region, thereby suggesting that Canadian Arctic sovereignty is grounded not on settler power but on Inuit perseverance. In so doing, the commemorative discourse inscribed on the plaques echoes something other than Duncan's statement—it echoes contemporary Inuit political discourses that strategically negotiate Inuit support for Canada's Arctic sovereignty claims on the global stage in exchange for greater Inuit autonomy in their own homelands as well as for a seat at the negotiating table in international Arctic debates.

This strategic bargain has been articulated more forcefully by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated First Vice-President James Eetoolook, who, upon announcing the creation of the Monument Project, asserted that

“at a time when ‘Canadian sovereignty’ is on the minds of politicians around the world, the media, and opportunistic businesses that look forward to an ice-free Northwest Passage, there is no better time to issue this reminder: this land belongs to Canada not because of the lines drawn on a map, but because of the Inuit who sacrificed everything to live here” (NTI 2009). Implicit in Eetoolook’s statement is the suggestion that Canadian sovereignty, marked as provisional by his scare quotes, hinges on Inuit organizations’ decision to ally themselves with Canada and to bolster the settler state’s claims with the crucial component of Inuit historical and present-day use and occupation of the region. Many Inuit politicians stress the vital role of Inuit in the ongoing dimensions of Canada’s de facto sovereignty and argue that, in exchange for greater Inuit political autonomy within their own territories, they will reinforce Canada’s claims in the global arena. In this context, “the materialization of . . . Inuit . . . *internal* political northern sovereignty is often presented by Northerners as an ultimate component necessary for the exercise of Canada’s Arctic sovereignty” (Loukacheva, 85).

Rather than perpetuating colonial paradigms that view settler-state and Indigenous sovereignties as necessarily pitted in a zero-sum game, many Inuit political organizations are fostering more nuanced conceptualizations of Canadian and Inuit sovereignties as strategically articulated forces that require vigilant and ongoing recalibration in the face of persistent colonial power asymmetries.²¹ While some Indigenous intellectuals have argued against capitulation to the Western political category of sovereignty, others invoke the term strategically as what Michelle Raheja calls “a placeholder for a multitude of indigenous designations” that “incorporates European notions of recognizing political autonomy” while also foregrounding “indigenous concepts of self-governance” (1164).²² My intent is not to argue for a recuperation of the concept of sovereignty as a way of framing Indigenous rights but, rather, to acknowledge the specificity of Arctic contexts and to take seriously the fact that many Inuit organizations are making significant interventions into sovereignty discourses. Amid global warming’s reignition of contests for Arctic resources among imperialist nation-states, the stakes for Inuit may be too great not to attempt to redefine, rather than supplant, the discursive terms set by dominant power structures. For Inuit living in the Arctic’s complex transnational zone, the risks of

not speaking the lingua franca of sovereignty may involve exclusion from conversations that determine the fate of Inuit homelands.

The Inuit Circumpolar Council's (ICC) 2009 *A Circumpolar Inuit Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* offers a compelling example of Inuit efforts to renegotiate the discourse of Arctic sovereignty. As a transnational organization with "Permanent Participant" status at the Arctic Council representing Inuit living within Russia, Canada, the United States, and Denmark/Greenland, the ICC developed its own declaration in response to the limits of "Arctic states' agendas on sovereignty and sovereign rights and the traditional monopoly claimed by states in the area of foreign affairs" (ICC).²³ Problematizing this monopoly, the ICC declaration asserts:

'Sovereignty' is a term that has often been used to refer to the absolute and independent authority of a community or nation both internally and externally. Sovereignty is a contested concept, however, and does not have a fixed meaning.

Old ideas of sovereignty are breaking down as different governance models, such as the European Union, evolve. Sovereignties overlap and are frequently divided within federations in creative ways to recognize the right of peoples. For Inuit . . . issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights must be examined and assessed in the context of our long history of struggle to gain recognition and respect as an Arctic indigenous people having the right to exercise self-determination over our lives, territories, cultures and languages. (ICC)

The ICC declaration thus affirms the complex doubled position of Inuit as both "citizens of Arctic states" and "an indigenous people" whose inhabitation of Inuit Nunaat (the collective Inuit homeland spanning the circumpolar Western hemisphere) historically precedes and hence legally exceeds the parameters of those nation-states, with inherent rights recognized by international law and the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (ICC). In so doing, the ICC articulates a vision of what Barry Scott Zellen calls "sovereign duality" (xxii)²⁴—a flexible and "overlap[ping]" model in which Inuit retain what the ICC declaration calls the "right to internal autonomy or self-government" and "rights to own, use, develop and control our lands, territories or resources," while provisionally linking themselves to the various states that have carved up Inuit Nunaat into multiple geopolitical entities (ICC).²⁵ At the same time, the ICC declaration affirms

“the inextricable linkages between issues of sovereignty and sovereign rights in the Arctic and issues of self-determination,” arguing that the full recognition of Inuit rights to self-determination also involves Inuit “representation in inter-governmental matters” and “external relations.”

The 1993 Nunavut Land Claims Agreement (NLCA)—the legislation that established the territory of Nunavut in which Resolute and Grise Fiord are located—is often cited as an exemplary “innovative and creative jurisdictional arrangement” (ICC) that forges a path for negotiating “sovereign duality” between the Canadian state and Inuit peoples. And yet, even the victory of the NLCA has been haunted by loss: in order for Inuit to gain legal recognition of their rights to any portion of land, they had to cede 83 percent of their territory to the state (Price, 129).²⁶ In exchange for this ceding of territory, “Inuit of Nunavut received a financial compensation package, the right to establish a territorial government, and a defined territory boundary” (129). Additionally, the federal government was required to provide financial support for education and employment training that would enable Inuit to staff their own government and implement devolution—the process of shifting “decision-making authority” away from “colonial centers of administration” and enhancing the powers of the new territorial government (Zellen, 8). However, such devolution has yet to occur, as the federal government continues to make all decisions about Crown land and to receive all royalties from corporations engaging in resource extraction and development on Nunavut territory (Government of Nunavut 2011).²⁷ As NTI Chief Executive Officer James Arreak avers, “Canada got everything it wanted as soon as it signed the Land Claim agreement,” while “Inuit are still waiting” for the federal government to fulfill its end of the bargain (qtd. in Jay). The stalling of devolution in Nunavut certainly has incentives for Canada, as the control of the increasingly lucrative lands, resources, and internal waterways in this area remain under federal jurisdiction so long as greater self-government by Inuit is deferred (Loukacheva, 101).

From the perspective of many Inuit, rather than definitively affirming Canada’s “title [to] over one-fifth of Canadian territory” as a static *fait accompli*, the NLCA renders the state’s claim contingent on the fulfillment of its continuing legal responsibilities as outlined in the agreement. Such a challenge has already emerged, as Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated filed a lawsuit in 2006 against the federal government

for its failure to meet its obligations under the NLCA—a case that remains ongoing.²⁸ As Paul Kaludjak of NTI asserts: “We are now in court because the Government of Canada has failed to implement an agreement which, given full force and effect, would strengthen Canada’s Arctic sovereignty” (qtd. in Byers, 119). The inverse is also implied in Kaludjak’s statement: the government’s breaches put the legitimacy of its Arctic sovereignty in jeopardy, particularly as some Inuit organizations are now considering “withdrawing support for Canada’s claim” (Byers, 120).²⁹ According to Nunavut Premier Eva Aariak, “We [the Inuit of Nunavut] support Canada’s position on Arctic sovereignty. But, by the same token, we expect Canada to recognize Nunavut’s sovereignty over the lands, waters and resources within our boundaries” (qtd. in Fraser, 30). From the perspective of many Inuit, therefore, the decision to cede an overarching title to Canada—in exchange for internal Inuit sovereignty—is an ongoing and conditional one that delicately balances the contingencies of intersecting systems of governance in ways that seek to maximize Inuit autonomy.

Inuit interventions into Arctic sovereignty debates, however, are not solely predicated on “using the language and methods of their former colonizers” (Loukacheva, 86). For, as Eetoolook’s comments suggest, there is a fundamental difference between the Government of Canada’s title to the region that rests on legal and cartographic forms of textual inscription—“lines drawn on a map”—and the forms of sovereign belonging that Inuit enact by living with and learning from the land. The key to implementing such a holistic conceptualization of Inuit political, social, and cultural sovereignty within Nunavut’s territorial government is the development of a system that is thoroughly informed by Inuit *Qaujimajatuqangit* (IQ), or what the Nunavut IQ Task Force has described as “the Inuit way of doing things: the past, present and future knowledge, experience, and values of Inuit Society” (Government of Nunavut 2002, 4). Although the Nunavut Act established Nunavut as a “public government” serving Inuit and non-Inuit alike, according to Jaypeetee Arnakak of Nunavut’s Department of Sustainable Development, “What sets the Nunavut government apart from other jurisdictions in Canada is that it has publicly promised to incorporate Inuit values” and IQ “into all aspects of its operations” (2002, 34). IQ, therefore, is the foundation for developing Inuit self-government beyond the letter of the law and for “actualizing [the] social and political aspirations

of a people" (33). While the Government of Nunavut has conducted significant research and consultation with elders to identify six "guiding principles" of Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit, *qanuqtuurunnarniq*—"the concept of being resourceful to solve problems"—is particularly crucial (Government of Nunavut 2002, 5).³⁰ According to Arnakak, "There is no single defining factor of being Inuit, but this comes close. Inuit culture is *qanuqtuurunnarniq*" (2000; 2002, 39). Such principles of "resourcefulness, the ability to improvise[,] and innovation are keys to adapting to an ever-changing environment. . . . It is what allowed Inuit to survive, even thrive, in an unforgiving environment using what is at hand and using the power of the intellect" (Arnakak 2002, 39).³¹ *Qanuqtuurunnarniq* is thus deeply rooted in Inuit lifeways developed over thousands of years of living in an Arctic environment, and yet it fundamentally affirms Inuit reinventions of social and political practices as something other than deviations from impossible ideals of cultural purity—as expressions of the resilience of Inuit identity. Viewed in relation to *qanuqtuurunnarniq*, the forming of strategic alliances with settler states may be considered a resourceful tactic of responding to "an ever-changing environment" rather than political surrender.

The Arctic Exile Monument Project enriches the political and juridical discourse of the ICC and other Inuit organizations' articulations of Arctic sovereignty by adding further layers of meaning embedded in the Inuit art of sculpture. The use of sculpture to commemorate the High Arctic Relocations and to affirm Inuit Arctic belonging interweaves at least three stories of *qanuqtuurunnarniq* in the face of colonial adversity. Similar to the way that this IQ principle informs Inuit conceptualizations of strategic and overlapping sovereignties, *qanuqtuurunnarniq*, as we will soon see, is also at the heart of both the history of the relocatees' overcoming of exile through practices of restorative place-making and the reclamation of Inuit sculpture amid colonial attempts to influence and coopt Inuit aesthetics. In knitting together the threads of these three stories shaping contemporary Inuit realities, the Monument Project also recalls a small but deeply resonant exception to the Nunavut Land Claims Agreement's ceding of Inuit land to the Crown. According to Article 19.9.4 of the NLCA, every "Inuk shall have the right to remove up to 50 cubic yards per year of carving stone from Crown lands without a permit and the right may be exercised on

Crown lands that are subject to other interests” (NTI, *Nunavut*). Although the significance of carving to the Nunavut economy was certainly a primary factor in establishing this clause (Lutz, 60), this moment in which Crown title is disrupted by longstanding Inuit cultural practices tied to a relationship with the land offers a glimpse into the possibilities of *qanuqtuurunarniq* within the constraints of an era of land claims and reconciliation.

THE ART OF SURVIVAL

To trace the entangled histories of the High Arctic Relocations and the state management of an Inuit art industry, we must follow a route that leads back to Inukjuak yet again. While Inukjuak was ground zero for the relocations, it was also the place where, in 1948, the Canadian Handicraft Guild’s northern emissary, James Houston, ostensibly “discovered” Inuit art. Upon hitching a ride on a Canadian Air Force plane bound for this Arctic Quebec outpost, Houston, an artist seeking inspiration from the mythic Canadian North, happened upon the thriving culture of Inuit carving that transformed local soapstone into works of art (Graburn 1987, 3). The sample carvings he brought back south piqued the interest of the Canadian Handicraft Guild, which sponsored Houston to travel north again in 1949 to purchase “several hundred carvings,” which sold in only three days (Lutz, 5). During the same period, federal bureaucrats became aware of the commercial viability of Inuit art as American military officers stationed throughout the Canadian Arctic paid generous sums for Inuit carvings (Graburn 2004, 145). According to anthropologist Nelson Graburn, while Canadian officials “were annoyed and probably jealous that the American military personnel in the Canadian North were willing to pay high prices for these small . . . carvings . . . they were proud that Inuit art was good enough to sell to Americans” (156). Spurred by this commercial success, the Department of Resources and Development began to sponsor Houston’s art-purchasing expeditions to the Arctic, and a network of cultural brokers, including the state, the Handicraft Guild, and the Hudson’s Bay Company, became linked together in operating a commercialized Inuit art industry.³²

In 1951, with Houston as author and illustrator, the Department of Resources and Development and the Handicraft Guild produced

and disseminated throughout the North an instructional booklet titled *Eskimo Handicrafts*, written in English and Inuktitut syllabics, that endeavored to teach Inuit how best to make Inuit art. *Eskimo Handicrafts* sought to “encourage” the production of, in the booklet’s words, “objects which are . . . acceptable to the white man” while exemplifying an aesthetic that was “purely Eskimo” (1). In 1953 Houston produced another manual for Inuit carvers, called *Senangoat*, which was distributed in “an irregular publication called *Eskimo Bulletin*” (Crandall, 99). In this document Houston wrote: “Eskimos are becoming well-known for their cleverness in carving. The things some of you make are very good and many people in the white men’s countries buy them and like them very much. Some things they like better than others and it is to let you know which things are best liked that we are writing this article” (qtd. in Crandall, 99).³³ That same year, Houston also prepared a buyers’ guide titled *Eskimo Handicrafts: A Private Guide for the Hudson’s Bay Company Manager 1953*, which he gave to HBC post managers to assist them in purchasing the carvings that would be most saleable in southern markets (Crandall, 97). At the same time that Houston translated the desires of Western consumers to Inuit artists, he also became a commercial mythmaker for southern art buyers, writing countless articles in magazines and art journals that fetishized “Eskimo” carvings as offering a glimpse into their makers’ animistic spirituality and primitive lifeways (Graburn 2004, 154). In 1953 the Department of Resources and Development assumed the helm of the burgeoning Inuit art industry, reducing the role of the Canadian Handicraft Guild to “that of a retail outlet, albeit one with special privileges,” hiring James Houston and his wife, Alma, directly as “Eskimo Field Officers” (Vorano, 373, 372), and “actively searching out new markets” for Inuit art (Goetz, 22).³⁴

Both the government’s displacement of Inuit to the Queen Elizabeth Islands and its attempts to develop an Inuit art industry were catalyzed by the thorny nexus of concerns regarding Inuit welfare dependency and Canadian Arctic sovereignty. With the collapse of the white fox fur market, the Department of Resources and Development seized on Inuit art production as an alternative source of income that could help to alleviate Inuit reliance on relief payments (Goetz, 12). With Houston’s promotional assistance, Inukjuak quickly rose to prominence as a significant center for soapstone carving and became known

as “the ‘birthplace’ of contemporary Inuit art” (Hessel, 80). While the going rate for a sealskin was “only fifty cents” and a fox pelt was “three dollars” in the early 1950s, Inuit could obtain “an average of five dollars per carving for small sculptures of animals and people” (Marcus, 114–15). Profits from Inuit handicrafts in Inukjuak jumped from a yearly total of \$76 in 1948 to \$11,700 in 1952 (Goetz, 22).³⁵ Despite the significant income and promise of further economic growth generated by Inuit carving in Inukjuak, the Department of Resources and Development persisted in moving forward with the relocations to the High Arctic in 1953. RCMP officers administering Ottawa’s relocation orders undermined the development of the art industry in Inukjuak by choosing to relocate several exceptional stone carvers, including Paddy Aqiatasuk, whose work had already become so internationally renowned that, when he died within his first year in Grise Fiord, he was commemorated with an obituary in *Time* magazine (Marcus, 116). When displaced to Resolute and Grise Fiord, the RCMP discouraged Inuit from pursuing the very craft that had been promoted in Inukjuak, directing the exiles to conform instead to a “rehabilitative” return to settler culture’s imaginary vision of a traditional hunting lifestyle (116). Additionally, the primary carving material of soapstone so plentiful in Inukjuak was not indigenous to the High Arctic. Despite these obstacles, relocatees employed the skills of *qanuqtuurnarniq* to work with local stone and keep the art of carving alive.

Evidence of the economic viability of the Inuit art industry in Inukjuak raises further doubt regarding the government’s cited rationale for the relocations: namely, a benevolent desire to rescue Inuit from poverty. If a purported socioeconomic crisis in Inukjuak was the only reason for the relocations, and the burgeoning art industry offered a financial solution, then why did the government persist with its plan? (Marcus, 114). One answer is that, at mid-century, agents working across a range of state apparatuses were operating without a clear consensus on federal Inuit policy, which vacillated between the northern extension of the welfare state and the return of Inuit to self-sufficiency. The second answer, which stands alongside the first, concerns once again the exploitation of Inuit to reinforce Canadian sovereignty. Just as the sovereignty agenda was crucial to the “pioneer experiment” of relocating Inuit to the Queen Elizabeth Islands, so also was sovereignty vital to the federal government’s interventions into Inuit art. The art

industry and the High Arctic Relocations thus played different yet complementary roles in the tangled circuits of Canadian Cold War sovereignty-claiming: while Inuit bodies were displaced to the High Arctic as human flagpoles marking Canada's claim to the region, the government circulated Inuit art across the globe as an international symbol of Canadian Arctic supremacy. As the prime minister's representative wrote in March 1953, just months before the relocations, "If we can get these [arts and crafts] in visible places . . . and to important people, we will be able to show the World, especially the United States and Russia, that we are indeed a true Northern Power" (qtd. in Graburn 2004, 150). Such was the logic informing the Canadian government's gifting of Inuit sculptures to notable international dignitaries, including Princess Elizabeth and Prince Philip on the occasion of their coronation in 1953. Additionally, the Department of External Affairs began to sponsor exhibitions of Inuit art throughout western and eastern Europe as a form of "Cold-War cultural nationalism" through which "Canada could re-affirm unequivocal title to the arctic" (Vorano, 426, 441).

More than fifty years later, the Arctic Exile Monument Project summons the entangled histories of the High Arctic Relocations and state intervention into the Inuit art industry in ways that attest to the relocatees' physical and cultural survival in the face of colonial adversity. In particular, the Monument Project tells another side of the story of James Houston's "discovery" of Inuit art. While Houston attempted to influence Inuit aesthetics to cater to a southern art market, Inuit artists transformed sculpture into a site of *qanuqtuurnnarniq*, or the practice of "resourcefulness" under difficult conditions (Arnakak 2002, 39). As art historian and curator Heather Igloliorte notes, "For artists [of the period], there is no doubt that there was an economic motivation behind the creation of artworks that featured traditional themes, as their main audience in the beginning were the primitive art enthusiasts of the international art market; those who had romanticized notions about daily lives of Inuit" (130). However, Inuit improvised ways to satisfy these market demands while, at the same time, using sculpture as a way of remembering "the stories they had told for millennia as well as the Indigenous knowledge bestowed on them by their ancestors" (130). The Monument Project affirms the particularly remarkable survival of Inuit sculpture as a cultural practice in Resolute and Grise Fiord, despite the hardships of exile and the RCMP's

attempts to curtail carving. The Monument Project attests to this cultural survival by featuring the work of two artists, Looty Pijamini of Grise Fiord and Simeonie Amagoalik of Resolute Bay, who have lived the legacy of the High Arctic Relocations and could create monuments for their home communities instead of Western art buyers. Rather than soliciting an open call for proposals, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated and the project committee directly commissioned Amagoalik and Pijamini as the clear choices to create the sculptures due to their knowledge of the relocations as well as their intimate familiarity with the lands upon which the monuments stand (Amagoalik).³⁶ In particular, Simeonie Amagoalik's life history is a testament to the interwoven stories of the relocations, sculpture, and survival. Born in Inukjuak in 1933, Amagoalik began carving fourteen years later by necessity, "trading his carvings for food" as an alternative to the unstable fur market ("Simeonie," 42). The Monument Project committee's choice of artists consequently reflects an awareness of the importance of representing the relocatees' practice of *qanuqtuurunarniq* in enacting both the art of survival in an extreme environment and the survival of Inuit art in the midst of colonial intervention.

As Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit connecting the past, present, and future, the monuments also spur new practices of Inuit cultural and political revitalization. To foster the transgenerational transmission of Inuit cultural knowledge through the IQ principle of *pilnimmaksarniq*—the "passing on of knowledge and skills through observation, doing, and practice"—the Monument Project prioritized opportunities for apprentices (Government of Nunavut 2002, 5). Pijamini worked with his son Matthew, while Amagoalik chose his nephew Jeffrey as his mentee. On the Monument Project's website, photographs depict not only the sculptures in their present form but also the process of their creation through which sculptors and their apprentices combined traditional hand-carving methods with the use of electric grinders and larger power tools (NTI, "Before and After"). Through this combination of traditional and contemporary techniques, the Monument Project challenges the binaric classifications of static authenticity and impure reinvention that have judged Inuit sculpture—and Inuit culture more generally—from external perspectives based in colonial fantasy. Even more broadly, the Monument Project gestures toward still-unfolding stories of the continued practice of *qanuqtuurunarniq*—the "ability to improvise with

what is at hand" (Arnakak 2002, 39)—not only in the reinvention of Inuit art but also in the reclaiming of Inuit homelands in a changing geopolitical climate.

THE STRANGENESS OF HOME

If contemporary Inuit political articulations of sovereign duality negotiate the messy entanglements of settler colonialism, the question that remains is just how much messiness can such formulations endure? The case of the High Arctic Relocations throws into relief the particularly challenging complications for Inuit land claims posed by colonial displacement, crystallizing the conundrum: how do Indigenous peoples claim autochthony when rendered diasporic? The Inuit Circumpolar Council's *Declaration on Sovereignty in the Arctic* implicitly grounds Inuit rights on the basis that "from time immemorial, Inuit have been living in the Arctic. . . . Our use and occupation of Arctic lands and waters pre-dates recorded history" (ICC). Settler cultures have variously scoffed at Indigenous claims to inhabitation since "time immemorial" as mythology rather than archaeological fact or, like Canada's *Statement on Arctic Foreign Policy*, coopted such claims to buttress the settler state's own assertion of sovereignty when convenient. In the legal arena of land claims, the concept of autochthony "since time immemorial" has often been turned against Indigenous peoples by the courts and reconfigured as an impossible demand for evidentiary documentation, as adjudicated by Western criteria, of an uninterrupted continuity of occupation of an area by a singular cultural group defined by a static identity over hundreds of years.³⁷ How might the Arctic Exile Monument Project respond to such unattainable criteria and make a case for Inuit sovereignty in the Queen Elizabeth Islands—an area Inuit had not inhabited for centuries prior to the relocations—while registering the exiles' early experiences of the region as an alien and alienating terrain?

To begin to answer these questions, I turn to a closer analysis of the sculptures themselves. At Resolute Bay, positioned at the original site where relocatees first landed in 1953, Simeonie Amagoalik's 1.8-meter-tall sculpture faces the Arctic Ocean. Though the hamlet has since moved a few miles north to a more sheltered location along the



Arctic Exile Monument Project sculpture at Resolute (Qausuittqu), Nunavut, 2010. Created by Simeonie Amagoalik (1933–2011). Limestone. 1.8 m. Photo by the author.

shores of the inner bay, the monument stands alone on the rocky, barren landscape of Cornwallis Island. The geographical isolation of the monument heightens the sense of abandonment conveyed by the sculpture itself, depicting the figure of a solitary Inuk man bracing himself in a guarded pose for the onslaught of an unknown future. Very little detail is given to the man's face or clothing; instead, the sculpture emphasizes only the broad contours of a body seemingly frozen in place. This simplicity of design may in part be a feature of Amagoalik's overarching sculptural aesthetic; some of his other works represent animal bodies with a similarly restrained use of detail, though with a greater sense of fluidity and curvature than the monument at Resolute.³⁸ The minimalist aesthetic employed in the Arctic Exile sculpture, however, may also be attributed to the sheer size of the sculpture—a significant departure from Amagoalik's typical work—and the fact that the monument at Resolute was his final work of art, created



Arctic Exile Monument Project sculpture at Grise Fiord (Ajuittuq), Nunavut, 2010. Created by Looty Pijamini (b. 1953). Granite. 2.1 m. Photo by the author.

as a labor of love while battling cancer. According to Simeonie's second cousin, John Amagoalik, "He created this monument for the relocation just before he died, and it didn't take very long after the [government's] apology that he died. . . . It seems to be that he was just waiting for that" (qtd. in "Simeonie," 42).

At Grise Fiord, Looty Pijamini's 2.1-meter-tall sculpture portrays missing pieces of the Inuk man's family—a mother and child gazing toward the Arctic Ocean, watching the ships that brought them ashore abandon them and sail away.³⁹ As Pijamini explains: "The mother, she's worried and you can see it in her face. And she would look at the child, the child was excited . . . because the child doesn't know what's before him. The mother knows what's before him, before her, . . . what's coming to her that winter and she's worried. If you look carefully, you will see that in that sculpture" (Pijamini). The mother's face dramatizes the experience of relocatees such as Sarah Amagoalik, Simeonie's wife, who, in testifying before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in 1990, reflected, "We were fearful and apprehensive about what was ahead of us, but there was no choice except to carry on. Such was our lot. We were left there by the ship which had brought us, leaving no means by which we could return"

(Government of Canada, 22:8). The sculpture of the mother and child at Grise Fiord is more detailed than the figure of the Inuk portrayed in *Resolute*, a difference that is most likely reflective of Pijamni's particular sculptural style, which is "known for . . . precision[,] . . . perfectionism," and attention to intricate detail ("Looty," 77).

Despite differences in sculptural intricacy, the monuments share overarching similarities in scale and in the thematic and affective expression of exile. Both the scale of the monuments and the thematic conceit of a family separated by geography and yearning for reconnection were collaboratively conceptualized by NTI and the Monument Project Committee.⁴⁰ In their design, the monuments give new shape and dimension to the relocatees' experiences of exile. Testifying before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in 1990, Martha Flaherty recalled her journey to Grise Fiord, noting, "When we finally arrived there, it was as if we had landed on the moon, it was so bare and desolate" (Government of Canada, 22:12). Translating this experience of estrangement into sculptural form, the monuments depict faces frozen in a state of apprehension while the stiff bodies appear suspended between life and death, suffering from the paralysis of what Inuit call *anarrasiktuq*, or homesickness (Marcus, 207). The sculptures accordingly dramatize what Zebedee Nungak,



Close-up of Pijamini's Grise Fiord monument. Photo by the author.

first vice-president of Makivik Corporation during the negotiation of the 1996 reconciliation agreement, describes as the trauma of exile: “The relocated people had not died, and this made the separation haunting. They were alive, but now . . . unreachably far away” from their kin in Inukjuak and Pond Inlet (31). This ghostly image of isolation is further intensified by the bodies’ lack of movement, a significant aesthetic departure from one of Inuit sculpture’s most remarkable qualities—its ability to depict bodies in motion, transforming stone into dynamic portrayals of Inuit hunting practices or animated wildlife such as the ubiquitous sculptural trope of the “dancing bear” (Hessel, 60). As James Houston remarked, “Flesh and bones and sheaths of muscle seem to move in their works. . . . According to the Eskimo, the best carvings possess a sense of movement that seems to come from within the material itself” (53). Pijamini’s work is typically alive with such dynamism, which he often creates by “floating” mythical figures and sea animals from caribou antler bases to create the effect of bodies swimming through the ocean. For instance, in *Lumaaq Legend* (1991), Pijamini depicts Lumaaq, a mother figure in Inuit lore, being pulled through the ocean by a whale. The antler base serves as the “waves” of the ocean, and their curvature and sense of “flowing lines” are reflected in the fluid ivory carvings of Lumaaq and the whale (Wight, 84). Similarly recreating other *unikkaatuat*, or Inuit legends, Pijamini has made several intricate carvings of Sedna, the mythical sea goddess, who, along with marine animals, is suspended in the air from an antler base.⁴¹ In striking contrast to the movement so characteristic of Inuit sculpture and typically practiced in Amagoalik and Pijamini’s works, both of the Arctic Exile monuments frame the relocatees in noticeably static, rigid poses, registering the devastating separation from kin and homeland, the animating forces of Inuit culture.

What the sculptures so profoundly convey, therefore, is the uncanny condition of exile, its strange living death. By depicting larger-than-life bodies immobilized in stone and fixed in place upon the ground, the sculptures hauntingly recall the state’s exploitation of Inuit as “human flagpoles” in a Cold War game of Arctic supremacy. At the same time, as land markers formed from local rock, the monuments intertextually reference the *inuksuk*, a symbolic tradition that, like Inuit sculptural aesthetics, has been appropriated and flattened of meaning as an icon of Canadian national identity. Although the ubiquitous settler



Lumaaq Legend (1991). Created by Looty Pijamini (b. 1953). Ivory, antler, sinew. 20 x 55 x 37.5 cm. Collection of the Winnipeg Art Gallery, Gift of Dr. Harry Winrob, 2006-621.1-5. Copyright: Canadian Arctic Producers (CAP). Photo by Ernest Mayer, Winnipeg Art Gallery.

reproductions of *inuksuk*, including the 2010 Vancouver Olympics logo, often resemble human figures, Inuit only construct *inunguat*, or *inuksuk* resembling “the shape of a person,” “to signify that there has been a murder” and offer “a declaration that no more will occur” (Martin, 149 n.52).⁴² In contrast to settler appropriations of *inuksuk*, which have mistakenly interpreted all Inuit stacked rock symbols as human forms, the most common Inuit uses of these land markers are nonhuman-shaped designs that indicate locations of plentiful hunting or food caches. For Inuit, then, *inuksuk* are primarily symbols of survival rather than death. By summoning these dense layers of meaning, the monuments register the struggle between the life-threatening impacts of the relocations and Inuit overcoming, as well as the deadening effects of settler appropriation and Inuit art’s role in revitalizing communities. Moreover, through their rich intertextual references to both human flagpoles co-opted by the state and Inuit landmarks old and new, the sculptures effect a complex evocation of the uncanny—the simultaneously familiar and foreign—in their design. In so doing, the monuments attest to the complex circuits of alienation and autochthony, uprooting and attachment, that relocatees have negotiated to make Resolute and Grise Fiord their home.

The sense of the uncanny that pervades the monuments also recalls the government's convoluted strategies of dispossession, on the one hand, and the appropriation of Inuit autochthony, on the other, that left Inuit hovering between the states of stranger and native in the far North. Department of Resources and Development employees often referred to the relocations as a "pioneer experiment" in "settlement," a rhetoric that enlisted Inuit as agents of Canadian nation-building and obscured the crucial differences between European colonization and Inuit ancestral belonging in the Arctic. At the same time, however, bureaucrats also described the scheme as a "migration" to naturalize the forced displacement of Inuit as a rehabilitative return to their seminomadic ways (Marcus, 75–76). This discursive ambivalence in framing the relocatees simultaneously as Canadian pioneers and Arctic natives reveals the logical contortions through which government officials mythologized Inuit Arctic inhabitation and yet subsumed it within a narrative of Canadian Arctic sovereignty. Such narratives, however, were the result of a fundamental ignorance regarding Inuit lifeways and relationships to the land. Traditional Inuit migration patterns typically involved seminomadic seasonal movement "between traditional summer and winter camps in a well-defined area of about fifty square miles" (76). These migration routes followed "a regular pattern" in which, "from one year to the next, practically the same camps form[ed], in the same places" (Collignon 2006a, 21).⁴³ For Inuit, migration is not about an indifference to place; rather, migration is about learning the land and making a homeland "that is inhabited and travelled following well-established routines. . . . Its various places are regularly visited; it is a 'lived' space" (43). Such seasonal migration therefore was of a vastly different order than a displacement of more than 1,500 kilometers farther north.

The choice of sculpture as the medium for remembering the state's convoluted appropriations of Inuit Arctic belonging connects the High Arctic Relocations with the state's management of an Inuit art industry, a program that similarly capitalized on Inuit autochthony and displacement for settler gain. Prior to Houston's so-called discovery of Inuit art, carving was practiced in relation to the rhythms of Inuit lifeways as families lived in seminomadic hunting camps. As Pijamini has remarked, "Inuit, they have been artists all the time. . . . I think the reason for that is that they'll be travelling out on the land and they

might be stranded and having to spend a few days [in camp, waiting out] bad weather. [In those cases,] they have nothing to do except carve little pieces, which they can take while they are travelling. Whenever they got caught in the bad weather, they would take it out and carve it" (Pijamini). When the Canadian Handicraft Guild and the Department of Resources and Development began to intervene in the marketing of Inuit art during the late 1940s and 1950s, they capitalized on the opportunities presented by the influence of the land on Inuit sculptural aesthetics. The small scale of carvings made them affordable to transport, purchase, and display in state-sponsored exhibitions across southern Canada and Europe.⁴⁴ To cater to Western fantasies of the primitive authenticity of an Inuit state of nature, government officials particularly encouraged small mimetic representations of Inuit or Arctic animals—Arctic inhabitants miniaturized and symbolically controlled by southern owners (Lutz, 106). In economic terms, state intervention sought to transform the Inuit custom of portability, or carrying on one's person, into a rationale of commercial circulation that separated art from its makers and turned carvings into commodities. In ideological terms, government officials coopted Inuit iconography and its expressions of intimate knowledge of the land as *national* iconography, circulating carvings of Inuit and animal bodies as mimetic evidence of Canadian Arctic "use and occupation," and as talismans of Canadian Arctic supremacy. These circuits of commerce intersected with other forms of state-imposed mobility, as the art items to be sold in southern Canada and Europe were often transported by the eastern patrol ship the *C. D. Howe*, the same vessel that carried the relocatees into exile in the far North.⁴⁵ This story of what Arjun Appadurai might call the social life of things reveals how the federal government's global traffic in Inuit art hauntingly mirrored, in inverse form, the coerced movement of Inuit bodies across the Arctic as they were deployed as pawns of the settler state. While Inuit were exiled from their kinship networks and displaced farther away from the influence of colonial "civilization," Inuit art was drawn into modernity's fold, refashioned for a settler fantasy of national Arctic indigenization.

Resisting further displacements of Inuit bodies and culture, the sculptures at Resolute and Grise Fiord translate Inuit carving to a monumental scale atypical for Inuit art that defies commercial circulation and further displacements of Inuit bodies and culture.⁴⁶ This alteration

in scale is not a contamination of Inuit sculptural authenticity but a form of *qanuqtuurunnarniq* amid a changing social and geopolitical environment. Just as small sculptures were part of Inuit's previous semi-nomadic rhythms of knowing place through traversing it, the sheer size and immovability of the monuments at Resolute and Grise Fiord reflect the political necessities of standing ground in an era of land claims and heightened international Arctic interest. In this sense, the monuments invent new ways of both expressing and enacting the intimate connection between Inuit sculpture and knowledge of the land. As Inuit artist and author Alootook Ipellie has observed, the creation of Inuit visual culture has always been intimately tied to a connection with the environment. According to Ipellie, "One reason so many Inuit become such good artists or carvers is that they come from a very visual culture. Their very livelihood depended solely on dealing with the landscape every day during hunting or gathering expeditions. They were always visualizing animals in their thoughts as they searched the land, waters and skies for game" (qtd. in Hessel, 37). The Arctic Exile Monument Project reasserts this connection between Inuit land and cultural practices by bringing sculpture home and creating pieces that are formed out of the environment from which they are born: the sculpture in Resolute is made out of the limestone found throughout Cornwallis Island, while the sculpture in Grise Fiord is made from a granite of the Arctic Cordillera surrounding the town. Carving human forms out of local stone, the monuments literally materialize the interconnection between the Inuit relocatees and the land they once found foreign but have now made their own through intimate engagement with the environment. In so doing, the sculptures point toward how the uncanny condition of exile might be transformed into a premise for a new form of Arctic belonging.

By depicting how the relocatees overcame the trauma of alienation to remake Resolute and Grise Fiord into places of belonging, the Monument Project complements other forms of Inuit *Qaujimaqatugangit* through which the relocatees have inscribed the truth of their experience, including *Inuktitut* toponymy. Although the federal government refers to the relocation sites as Resolute and Grise Fiord, Inuit know them as *Qausuittuq* (the "place with no dawn") and *Ajuittuq* (the "place that never thaws") (Mantel and Lane, 21). The English names for these sites reflect a colonial tradition of exploration and proprietary

claim-staking, as *Resolute* is “named after the [British Royal Navy] ship HMS *Resolute*,” sent to the region in 1850–51 in search of the crew from the ill-fated Franklin Expedition of 1845, while Grise Fiord is an Anglicization of Norwegian explorers’ name for the site (Marcus, 206).⁴⁷ In contrast, the creation of what Robert Williamson calls an Inuit “namespace”—a richly storied sense of belonging to a place forged through practices of naming “each geographical feature”—is not about a foreign imposition of proprietary title upon the land (qtd. in RCAP, 10). Rather, the making of a namespace is a practice of coming to know the land intimately through a “long experience of relatedness with . . . [an] environment” (11) through which the attachment to habitat becomes “as strong as the attachment of kinship. It is a love of a very profound kind” (10). The land is made kin as the bones of ancestors are returned to the earth and become part of it. Place names are thus “metaphor[s] for the totality of the group remembrance of all forms of land relatedness, of the successes and failures in hunting, . . . [of] births, deaths, childhood, [and] marriage” (Williamson qtd. in RCAP, 10–11). If the relocatees had wished to remain entirely estranged from the places known as *Resolute* and *Grise Fiord*, they would have allowed the colonial nomenclature for these sites to stand alone. Instead, in forging a connection with their new environments, the relocatees continued the Inuit practice of creating a namespace while transforming it in a way that registered the truths of their experiences. As Beatrice Collignon suggests, “Place names act like witnesses telling us about the relationship Inuit build with their environment” (2006b, 202). Unlike most Inuktitut place names that describe what is present in a given location (e.g., *Pangniqtuuq* is the “place of the bull caribou” and *Uqsuqtuuq* is the “place of plenty blubber”), the Inuktitut names for *Qausuittuq* and *Aujuittuq* mark place in terms of what is missing. For instance, the name *Qausuittuq* describes *Resolute* not in terms of what it is—namely, a place where it is always dark—but in terms of what is absent in comparison to the lost homeland of *Inukjuak*; it is “without dawn.” Similarly, *Aujuittuq* defines *Grise Fiord* as a site where something fails to occur—it is a “place that never thaws”—thereby implicitly referencing an elsewhere that is melted by summer warmth. In this sense, the names *Qausuittuq* and *Aujuittuq* register the distance and strangeness from the relocatees’ original homelands.⁴⁸ At the same time, by implicitly invoking a comparison to another land, the names

forge a sense of relationality between Qausuittuq, Aujuittuq, and Inukjuak, suturing distant sites together into an expanded Arctic homeland. These acts of Inuktitut naming bear witness to the relocatees' persistent efforts to come to know and to build a relationship to their new environment. The legacies of toponymy and of sculpture in the High Arctic, therefore, are ones of both loss and of love.

The Monument Project similarly marks Qausuittuq and Aujuittuq as sites of loss and love and, in so doing, suggests how the memory of alienation might paradoxically form the basis of connection to the land. As a testament to the overcoming of exile, the monuments' uncanny resonances function most compellingly as an affective index of Inuit lived engagement with the environment. In other words, although the relocations rendered Inuit temporarily diasporic, reeling from the loss of displacement, the relocatees' understanding of their condition as unhomey is the very proof of their knowledge of Arctic lands. In contrast, the settler state's territorial claims, founded on the cooptation of Inuit inhabitation, are exposed as artificial and bereft of the knowledge that can only be developed through daily engagement. As John Sandlos has observed, unlike colonialism in southern Canada, where a "parallel community of non-indigenous settlers" sought to establish their own homes on Indigenous land, "the early process of colonization in the North proceeded almost entirely as an ideological and institutional project" organized from a distance (6). The High Arctic Relocations were the result of such rule from afar, operating with false assumptions regarding the essential sameness of Inuit and the Arctic territory they inhabit. Reflecting on his role in recruiting families for the relocations, RCMP constable Ross Gibson has expressed such conjecture: "I knew pretty well what it was like on Ellesmere Island. I never had been there, but I could read and was interested in what I'd heard, and from my own common sense I couldn't see that the conditions up there . . . were that much different than where they already were, because they already lived in igloos. They already lived in skin tents. . . . They already hunted seal" (qtd. in Tester and Kulchyski, 140).

Often relying on "anecdotal information" from the colonial archive of explorers' journals and early RCMP reports written about disparate locations at discrepant historical moments, federal bureaucrats in Ottawa and even their ancillary RCMP agents culled together a phantasmatic image of the Arctic that obscured the substantial differences

between Inukjuak and Resolute and Grise Fiord roughly 1,500 kilometers farther north (Tester and Kulchyski, 125–26). To write it down was to make it so, and to read from the colonial archive was to “know pretty well what it was like”—even if one “never had been there.” Thus, the RCMP and the Department of Mines and Resources read the High Arctic through a lens of exploration that sought to render an alien terrain controllable through colonial inscription—words in an archive or “lines on a map.” In contrast, the relocatees engaged in an ethics of *inhabitation* that lived the differences between distinct Arctic environments.

Six decades later, the Arctic Exile Monument Project honors the relocatees’ remarkable ability to transform forced dispossession into a renewed engagement with the land and a condition of belonging. In the process, the Monument Project not only commemorates the particular hardships and achievements of the original High Arctic relocatees and their descendants; it also crystallizes a compelling formulation of Inuit sovereignty that speaks to both past injustices and current struggles. Although the Monument Project depicts a particular history of forced displacement, its implications are much broader, for the uncanny paradox of alienation and intimate habitation portrayed so powerfully in the sculptures is at once a distinctly devastating experience particular to the High Arctic relocatees and a symptom of broader forms of colonial dispossession. The ground beneath Inuit feet has been pulled out from under them many times, through several other forced relocations across the Arctic as well as the transformation of Inuit landscapes and lifeways by fur traders and, later, the government’s establishment of settlements throughout the region.⁴⁹ Today, such processes of alienation proceed through the seemingly more mundane forms of what Rob Nixon calls “slow violence,” an “attritional violence” of “delayed destruction” through which imperialist states and multinational corporations ravage environments with resource extraction and industrial development (2). Nixon refers to this process as “a more radical notion of displacement, one that, instead of referring solely to the movement of people from their places of belonging, refers rather to the loss of the land and resources beneath them, a loss that leaves communities stranded in a place stripped of the very characteristics that made it inhabitable” (19). Slow violence has literally altered the shape of the Arctic as global warming melts away glaciers and icebergs that Inuit have depended on for potable water (Byers, 9, 13). Even the

victory of the 1993 Nunavut Land Claim Agreement has been an ambivalent process of gaining and losing ground. In this sense, the name Nunavut—Inuktitut for “Our Land”—ironically registers the alienating shadow-effects of modern land claim structures through which a claiming of land hinges on relinquishing large portions of it to settler-state control.

In the face of such immense challenges, the Monument Project offers a rejoinder. By foregrounding belonging as an ongoing process of living relationships with the land, the Monument Project moves beyond fetishistic conceptualizations of Indigenous place as pure or unchanging; it points toward new ways of negotiating the complexities of restorative place-making in the wake of colonial trespass and upheaval. The sculptures thus materialize a nuanced and durable conceptualization of Inuit sovereignty that resists the impossible fantasies of Indigenous authenticity and cultural and geographic stasis upon which the juridical and political recognition of Indigenous rights often hinge. The Monument Project also challenges the West’s fantasy of the absolute sovereignty of settler states and the irrefutability of their legal title to territory by marking the land as a site of Inuit dwelling and Inuit experiential knowledge that exceeds the claims of *de jure* sovereignty. In so doing, the Monument Project tells a story of Inuit sovereignty as a living practice of intimate relationship with the Arctic environment.

CODA: THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME

More than three years after the federal apology for the High Arctic Relocations, the sculptures located at Resolute and Grise Fiord have been gifted by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated to the local communities, where they have become part of the daily landscape. The media reporters and government officials who came for the unveilings are long gone, and the hamlets of Qausuittuq and Ajuittuq have returned to their routines. Resolute’s and Grise Fiord’s residents do not require a physical reminder of the High Arctic Relocations of 1953 and 1955, as almost everyone in town has been touched by the government’s “pioneer experiment” in some way. The ramifications of that experiment continue to be viscerally felt, as the condition of exile persists in the stunningly high cost of food in these remote locations, the lack of

fresh fruits and vegetables and many other staples most Canadians take for granted, the dearth of employment and life opportunities, and the fact that the only way out (beyond dogsled or *qamutik*) remains exorbitant airfare that, in Grise Fiord, consists of a flight on a small twin otter plane available only twice a week, weather permitting (and it often doesn't). As Pijamini told me, "Grise Fiord is a bad place to live in. It's . . . [the] very, very best place to look at. But it's a very bad place to live in, . . . money-wise. . . . The government put us there and they just left us and we're end[ing] up paying for it up to today because of the high costs of having to live there. That's a bad side of it, I think" (Pijamini). Thus, what the Monument Project sculptures commemorate for local residents is much more than the historical experience of the relocations: the sculptures stand as a testament to Inuit resilience, not only in the face of exile and its enduring ramifications but also in the project of redress for colonial injustices. The sculptures commemorate the long journey toward government recognition of and compensation for the exploitation of Inuit, a journey that has persisted despite the settler state's efforts to frame reconciliation as a *fait accompli* time and again, in 1996 and in 2010.

In Aujuittuq, Looty Pijamini's sculpture stands perched on a hill behind the co-op store, watching over the town. Unlike most of the art he has created throughout his lifetime—which now resides in owners' homes, embassies, and galleries far away—Pijamini can see the monument from his living room window in the months when the sun shines. He plans to continue working on it one summer when he can find time amid his other sculpture projects as, in his opinion, the monument is very much still a work in progress. NTI ran out of time and money and had to proceed with the unveilings with the sculptures in their current state—a state that many who take just a passing glance assume is complete. According to Pijamini, however, the bottom half of his sculpture requires more detail, especially the small mound of rock perched next to the woman's side. That mound, he informed me, is a husky dog coming into emergence. When I asked Looty, "So, you'd like to create a dog that's not there right now?" he quickly corrected me and challenged my perspective: "Well, he's partly there. . . . He needs to be focused more" (Pijamini). For Pijamini, the work of remembering the High Arctic Relocations through his art is a continuous commitment, not a "dark chapter" (to recall Minister Duncan's apology)

in a book of history that can now be considered closed. This is his way of keeping the work of Inuit place-making and sovereignty-building alive. For many other Inuit in Qausuittuq, Ajujittuq, and across Nunavut, the Arctic Exile Monument Project might do much more than commemorate a living past; the sculptures might help inspire new strategies for Inuit justice-seeking in the midst of shifting ground.

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Notes

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1. Tester and Kulchyski quote from a memorandum written by department employees for the deputy minister of Resources and Development on March 16, 1953 (138). The first federal department to govern Indigenous peoples was the Department of the Interior, which existed between 1873 and 1935. In 1936 that ministry was amalgamated with the Department of Mines and Resources. In 1950 it was renamed the Department of Resources and Development, which in turn transformed into the Department of Northern Affairs and National Resources in 1953 and, subsequently, the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development in 1966 (Goetz, 4; Marcus, xv). In June 2011 the name was changed again to the Department of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development. According to the Royal Commission, the decision to initiate the relocations was made by the Department of Resources and Development (RCAP, 9).

2. The Royal Commission report states, "Neither Craig Harbour nor Resolute Bay [the initial relocation sites] is in an area of recent Inuit habitation. The area was inhabited centuries ago, but it is not known why those early settlements were abandoned" (RCAP, 94). Although the particular date ranges have been debated, there is general agreement that the High Arctic was once inhabited by the Thule, predecessors of Inuit, and that the Thule left the region by 1750 at the latest due to

a major climatic shift referred to as the “Little Ice Age,” which is thought to have occurred between 1400 and 1600 (Fagan, 210). Marcus suggests that the “Thule Inuit had left the area during either the first phase of the Little Ice Age, about 1450 to 1520, or the third phase, around 1600 to 1750. . . . As winters became intolerably cold, . . . game migrated southwards, the people followed, and the land was left uninhabited” (92).

3. Because “Inuit” literally means “the people,” to avoid redundancy, I refer to “Inuit” rather than “Inuit people” or “the Inuit” throughout this paper. The word “Inuk” refers to a single person. Additionally, “the identity and geographical location of an Inuit band is described by the suffix *-miut*, meaning ‘people of.’ The Inuit living in the area of Port Harrison are the ‘Inukjuamiut’ (people of Inukjuak)” (Marcus, xv–xvi).

4. The Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (formerly the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada) is the national Inuit organization in Canada. In 1982 John Amagoalik, working as president of the Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, launched one of the first formal requests for reparations for the relocations, requesting “financial assistance from the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development (DIAND) to cover the cost of homes and transportation for 16 families wishing to return to Inukjuak” (Grant, 3). The government responded by claiming that it had already paid \$950,000 toward relocating Inuit back to Inukjuak, though Inuit contested that assertion (4).

5. Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) is tasked with investigating the history and ongoing effects of the residential school system operated by the federal government and church organizations for more than a century. The TRC is the product of the 2006 Indian Residential Schools Settlement Agreement, a multiparty court-approved settlement among the federal government, the Assembly of First Nations, the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, church organizations, and lawyers representing residential school survivors. The TRC commenced in June 2008 and is scheduled to conclude in 2015.

6. The Monument Project working committee included relocatees, NTI and Makivik staff, the community liaison officers and mayors of Resolute and Grise Fiord, and the two commissioned artists, Simeonie Amagoalik and Looty Pijamini. For a complete list of committee members, see page 1 of the fall 2009 issue of NTI’s magazine, *Naniiliqpita*. Due to the complexities of modern land claim agreements, Inukjuak (the original homeland of many relocatees) is now part of the land claim region of Nunavik, while the relocation sites of Grise Fiord and Resolute fall within the boundaries of Nunavut, which was created in 1993 by the Nunavut Land Claim Agreement. In the 1980s and early 1990s, prior to the existence of Nunavut and NTI, Makivik Corporation took the lead in advocating for the relocatees. Makivik is the organization representing the 1975 James Bay and Northern Quebec Agreement and the Nunavik Inuit Land Claim Agreement of 2008.

7. At the time that Minister Duncan offered the apology, the department was still referred to as the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development.

8. While filming *Nanook of the North* in Inukjuak, Flaherty fathered a child with the actress who played Nyla, Nanook’s wife in the film. Their son, Joseph

Flaherty, was born a few months after filming had been completed and Flaherty had already left the region. Joseph Flaherty and his family, including daughter Martha Flaherty, were among the Inukjuak Inuit selected as relocatees (Marcus, 67).

9. According to the Royal Commission's report, "Available information allows for precision only within one or two people. The figures given exclude the Inuit special constables and their families at Craig Harbour" (RCAP, 7).

10. The relocatees sent to Ellesmere Island were first deposited at Craig Harbour, thirty-five miles east of what became the permanent relocation site of Grise Fiord. Within the first week of disembarking at Craig Harbour, however, the RCMP moved the relocatees to the Lindstrom Peninsula (Marcus, 88). In the late 1950s the community was moved again to the current site of Grise Fiord (RCAP, 8).

11. The Makivik position paper is included as an appendix in the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs' investigation into the High Arctic Relocations in 1990. The page numbers listed in the parenthetical citation refer to the House of Commons citation. The full title of the Makivik submission is "Position Paper Regarding Grise Fiord/Resolute Bay Relocation Issues," January 20, 1987. The report is credited to Makivik Corporation, Inuit Tapirisat of Canada, and the Kativik Regional Government.

12. The creation of the Arctic Islands Preserve in 1926 and related conservation restrictions were the product of Canadian sovereignty concerns prompted by Greenlandic Inuit hunting trips to Ellesmere Island. By creating the preserve and requiring hunting licenses, the government had "a further legal instrument for discouraging Greenlandic hunters" (Marcus, 51).

13. Damas remains skeptical of claims that the relocations were motivated in part by a sovereignty consideration (52), and yet he notes the improvement in conditions in Inukjuak in 1952 and acknowledges that the overpopulation argument was specious (what he calls "persistently enlisted") (53). Damas also admits that his research "relied largely on police reports and related correspondence"—documents that would minimize the hardships of the relocations and play up the government's declared benevolent rationale for the relocations (56).

14. The debates regarding the sovereignty motive for the relocations are well-tread terrain, particularly due to significant research in the 1990s that accompanied or complemented the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples' investigation. Similar to Tester and Kulchyski (119), RCAP asserted that although "economic and social concerns were primary," the "weight of the evidence points to sovereignty as a material consideration in the relocation decision. There is also some evidence to indicate that sovereignty was a consideration in the decision to continue the Grise Fiord settlement. It is also clear that the relocation did contribute to the maintenance of Canadian sovereignty" (133, 132).

15. While Inuit were technically granted the right to vote in 1950, most regions of the Arctic were not "included in any existing electoral district under the Canada Elections Act," and Inuit were thus unable to exercise this right until 1962 (Tester and Kulchyski, 96). Inuit were included in the Indian Act for a period of four years.

As Bonesteel, writing under contract by the Department of Indian and Northern Affairs, reports, "In 1924, a bill was passed to amend the *Indian Act*, assigning responsibility for Inuit to the Department of Indian Affairs, but ensuring Inuit would remain Canadian citizens" and not wards of the state (v). In 1928 "an order in council transferred authority for Inuit from Indian Affairs to the Northwest Territories (NWT) Council, which operated within the Department of the Interior. In 1930, the Canadian Government repealed the 1924 amendment to the *Indian Act*" (Bonesteel, 6).

16. As John Amagoalik asserted before the House of Commons Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs in 1990, "The Japanese Canadians have been apologized to and they have been given \$280 million in compensation. We note that the Chinese Canadians are about to be compensated, and there is now talk of Italians being compensated. Now, we are not arguing against that. We agree that Canadians have suffered injustices and that these things need to be put right. . . . But we also say we deserve that too, perhaps more so" (Government of Canada, 22:16). Although the federal government's approach to redress claims has shifted numerous times since the first state apology presented in 1988 to Japanese Canadians for their internment during World War II, with the commencement of Stephen Harper's Conservative administration in 2006, a significant number of apologies to diverse marginalized constituencies have been issued (James 2013, 35). The enfolding of Indigenous redress claims within the Canadian government's template for apology has enabled a conflation of Indigenous and diasporic constituencies' injuries as well as the normative remedy prescribed for all groups: the recognition of aggrieved parties' contributions to Canadian nation-building and the promise of full citizenship inclusion and equality rights as a reparative gesture. While such gestures may or may not be of value to the heterogeneous racialized minority groups in Canada, the restoration of equality rights to Indigenous groups erases the specificity of inherent Indigenous rights to land and self-determination (Henderson and Wakeham, 4, 13–14).

17. According to Matt James, there was a small and "poorly publicized signing ceremony in Iqaluit" on March 28, 1996, that accompanied the signing of the reconciliation agreement. Jean Chrétien, the Liberal prime minister at the time, did not attend the event. What survives in the historical record today are only newspaper articles from the period and the legal text of the agreement (2008, 143).

18. In the 1990s the Canadian government began to examine the need for a clear Arctic foreign policy. This work culminated in the September 1998 "consultation paper," "Toward a Northern Foreign Policy," produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (1998). (In 2013, the department changed its name to Foreign Affairs, Trade, and Development and the website was revamped. This paper was removed at that time.) In the foreword to the 1998 paper, then Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Lloyd Axworthy stated that the paper was a "work in progress" that "for the first time places the essential elements of Canadian policy for the domestic and circumpolar north within a comprehensive, flexible foreign policy framework." Over the next decade, the federal government released

Canada's Northern Strategy: Our North, Our Heritage, Our Future as a domestic policy framework for governing the North in 2009, followed in August 2010 by the *Statement on Canada's Arctic Foreign Policy: Exercising Sovereignty and Promoting Canada's Northern Strategy Abroad*—a document whose subtitle announces itself as integrally articulated to the 2009 Northern Strategy as its foreign policy complement.

19. According to Byers, “The Inuit have been central to Canada’s sovereignty claims since 1930, when the federal government invoked Inuit interests to deny a Norwegian request for commercial access to the Sverdrup Islands. In 1986, the proclamation of straight baselines around the Canadian Arctic Archipelago was justified partly on the basis that these were consolidated by Inuit use and occupancy” (119).

20. James develops this argument in relation to the Harper Conservatives’ Community Historical Recognition Program (CHRP). According to CHRP guidelines, “Only injustices qualifying as ‘wartime measures or immigration restrictions’ are eligible for consideration” (James 2013, 37), thereby excluding most injustices concerning Indigenous peoples. That said, the strategies of “bureaucratic commemoration” and the temporal containment of injustices are part of an overarching approach that also informs the federal government’s management of Indigenous calls for redress.

21. The particular nature of this recalibration is articulated differently by a range of organizations and political spokespersons. President of the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami, Mary Simon, frames the practice of “Arctic stewardship”—in the form of federal contributions to improved “social and community wellness, economic and political development” and environmental protection—as the crux of the Canadian state’s enactment of de facto sovereignty (Loukacheva, 84, 89). In comparison to Simon, Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated’s leaders have at times offered a more forceful articulation of the opinion that Canadian Arctic sovereignty hinges upon the fulfillment of the NLCA and that nonfulfillment puts the state’s claims in jeopardy. Former Premier of Nunavut Paul Okalik has similarly been vocal in this regard (Loukacheva, 99). Former Iqaluit mayor Madeleine Redfern has argued that Inuit should consider the model of “home rule” established in Greenland as a possibility for gaining greater independence (Jay).

22. Taiaiake Alfred calls for a “rejection of the term and notion of indigenous ‘sovereignty’” (466) because it has “limited the ways we are able to think, suggesting always a conceptual and definitional problem centered on the accommodation of indigenous peoples within a ‘legitimate’ framework of settler state governance” (461). As part of his critique, Alfred contends that “the actual history of our plural existence [i.e., both the plurality of numerous Indigenous nations across North America as well as the plural governance structures of “indigenous peoples and European newcomers” (460)] has been erased by the narrow fictions of a single sovereignty” (460). Inuit leaders, I suggest, are attempting to recuperate this idea of plural sovereignties and governance structures both within the settler state and through transnational alliances.

23. The Arctic Council describes itself as “a high-level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction

among the Arctic States, with the involvement of the Arctic Indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues" (Arctic Council, "About"). The organization was created in 1996 and includes the member states of Canada, Denmark/Greenland, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. The Inuit Circumpolar Council is one of six "Permanent Participant" Indigenous organizations with "full consultation rights in connection with the Council's negotiations and decisions" (Arctic Council, "Permanent").

24. According to Zellen, "In the North, the aspiration for the restoration of tribal sovereignty has not, generally speaking, meant a rejection of the overarching reach of national sovereignty into the North, but instead an acceptance of what one may think of as sovereign duality, with Native being both loyal citizens of the modern state . . . while at the same time fully identifying with their proud and ancient traditions. . . . For the state to maintain its own sovereign control over its northern borders, it has turned to the Native peoples of the region, through the reciprocal recognition of each other's sovereignty" (xxii). While I would argue that the practice of sovereign duality is not as reciprocal on the part of the "modern state" as Zellen suggests, nor does it need to hinge upon Inuit sentiments of loyalty and patriotism, his concept of "sovereign duality" is useful for articulating the strategic overlapping that I am referring to. Douglas Johnston similarly argues that "internally, . . . Canada might be said to have a 'dual sovereignty' in the North" in which Nunavut exercises sovereignty over its internal affairs while being articulated to the Canadian nation-state (146).

25. Political scientist Michael Byers argues that "sovereignty is related to self-determination, which is the right of a people to freely determine their political status. Recognized in the 1945 UN Charter, self-determination was an important factor in the decolonization of the developing world. But it remains unsettled as to whether, and in what circumstances, self-determination entitles a people to carve a new state out of a territorially cohesive pre-existing country" (7–8). Byers adds that "Canada's Inuit are not seeking independence, but they believe their right of self-determination entitles them to participate in decision-making about the North" (8). Implicit in Byers's comments is the suggestion that Inuit assert their right to self-determination but not to sovereignty, which he understands in terms of classic definitions of a discrete territorial entity exercising complete control over what occurs within its boundaries. This is the discourse of international law mobilized by the Canadian state. Natalia Loukacheva argues that "from the perspective of Inuit and some other commentators, however, there is another vision of sovereignty" that emphasizes the necessity of the Canadian state's *de facto* responsibilities, including provision of "adequate human development, well-being, economic self-reliance, and political autonomy" (94).

26. The idea of redress as being shaped by simultaneous victories and losses is inspired by Lily Cho's work on Chinese Canadian redress and Roy Miki's work on Japanese Canadian redress (Cho, 89).

27. In 2008, the Government of Canada, the Government of Nunavut, and Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated signed the Nunavut Lands and Resource

Management Devolution Protocol—a framework for future devolution negotiations. In May 2012 a federal negotiator was appointed and discussions finally began (“Nunavut to begin”). Negotiations are still ongoing.

28. The lawsuit filed against the Government of Canada in December 2006 by NTI was “for breach of the NLCA implementation contract” (Timpson, 209). The primary issue concerned the nonfulfillment of Article 23 of the NLCA, which stipulates that “the percentage of government jobs held by Inuit match their share of the population” (Byers, 112). While Inuit currently constitute 85 percent of Nunavut’s population, they only comprise 45 percent of the government’s employees, a problem crucially linked to the public education system currently in place in Nunavut (Timpson, 206). In 2005 Justice Thomas Berger was appointed conciliator for the parties to the NLCA negotiations. Following the release of his final report, the federal government did not implement any of his recommendations. In response to government inaction, NTI filed their lawsuit. For further information, see Timpson, 206–9; and NTI 2012.

29. Legal precedent set by the International Court of Justice in the 1975 Western Sahara case affirms such an interpretation of the NLCA, as the “transfer of [sovereignty] rights” by an Indigenous people to a state may be “weakened if the recipient fails to uphold” the terms of agreement “or to address other basic grievances held by the transferees” (Byers, 112).

30. Although “the infix *-tuqa-*” literally means “old” or “ancient,” the concept of Inuit Qaujimagatuqangit is not intended to refer to static knowledge from the past (Martin, 152 n.3). The six basic principles of IQ are: *Pijitsirniq* (“The concept of serving [a purpose or community] and providing for [family and/or community]”); *Aajiqatigiingniq* (“The Inuit way of decision-making” through “comparing views or taking counsel”); *Pilnimmaksarniq* (“The passing on of knowledge and skills through observation, doing and practice”); *Piliriqatigiingniq* (“The concept of collaborative working relationships or working together for a common purpose”); *Avatittinnik Kamattarniq* (“The concept of environmental stewardship”); and *Qanuqtuurniq* (“The concept of being resourceful to solve problems”) (Government of Nunavut 2002, 4–5). Note that Arnakak spells *qanuqtuurniq* as *qanuqtuurrnarniq* (2003, 37). In keeping with my quotations from Arnakak, I use the latter throughout this essay.

31. Thank you to Keavy Martin for introducing me to Arnakak’s work. Martin builds upon Arnakak’s discussion of *qanuqtuurrnarniq* in her own analysis of how “Inuit literary texts and traditions readily adopt ‘new skins’—new labels, systems, or frameworks—when strategically useful” (99).

32. From the late 1940s until 1953, the federal government “was only very indirectly involved” in this process, funding Houston’s “travel and salary” while the Canadian Handicraft Guild offered the capital for purchasing the handicrafts and “the local Hudson’s Bay Company post manager” bought the carvings from Inuit artists (Goetz, 12). The phrase “cultural brokers” is from the work of art historian Norman Vorano, whose dissertation provides a probing examination of “the way different *Qallunaat* [white] agents, working in consort but with different agendas,

began to promote, exhibit, legitimize, authenticate and discursively shape 'Eskimo art' around the world in the early 1950s" (4).

33. The 1953 manual was written in Inuktitut syllabics but has since been translated into English by Charles Martijn (Crandall, 99).

34. Though carving or sculpture has always been the dominant form of Inuit visual art and the centerpiece of the commercial art industry, the federal government also supported Inuit drawing and printmaking. Today, sculpture continues to "constitute about 80 per cent of Inuit art production" and is "considered the pre-eminent art form in most communities and the one with which Inuit art is most readily associated" (Hessel, 73).

35. According to Igloliorte, Goetz's figures are based on "prices paid by the Guild, the HBC, the Catholic and Anglican missionaries, and military personnel" (135).

36. Pijamini is the son of one of the Inuit special constables who worked at the RCMP detachment on Ellesmere Island that oversaw the settlement of the relocatees. He is a resident of Grise Fiord and a celebrated sculptor who graduated from the jewelry and metalwork program at Nunavut Arctic College. His piece *Swan*, a "sterling silver hollow-ware sculpture" (NTI, "Artists"), won the Grand Overall prize in the Eastern Arctic Fine Arts and Crafts Competition of 1993 and was featured in the *Inuit Sculpture Now* exhibition produced by the National Gallery of Canada (Lalonde, 25). His sculptures are also displayed at the Prince of Wales Northern Heritage Centre in Yellowknife, Northwest Territories, and, in 2003, an exhibition dedicated to Pijamini's sculptures was displayed at the Department of Aboriginal Affairs' national office (NTI, "Artists").

37. As Elizabeth Povinelli demonstrates, "Today native title in Australia can be extinguished if the genealogical and occupancy relationship to land is severed and, *in addition*, if the customary beliefs and practices of the group claiming native title are severed *more or less*. In the United States and Canada, legal proof of native title rests on demonstrating a genealogical connection to the original owners of the land and continued occupancy of the land, not on demonstrating a cultural continuity with these original owners. . . . But although the law of recognition is not grounded in the performance of cultural continuity in the United States, it is supplemented by public accounts of the justice of granting 'special rights' to native Americans who appear to be too culturally and socially like nonnative Americans" (156). This latter point, I contend, is also applicable to the Canadian context.

38. Reconstructing Amagoalik's broader oeuvre reveals much more about the socioeconomic conditions surrounding his art than a thorough understanding of his aesthetic style. Because, at many points in his life, Amagoalik relied on sculpture as a means of basic subsistence, most of his work appears to have been purchased by private collectors and, thus, very little record of it remains. While I have been unable to locate any sculptures by Amagoalik in museum and gallery collections, one of his sculptures is held in the Qarmartalik School in Resolute and two others are available for sale on the Spirit Wrestler Gallery website.

39. As Tester and Kulchyski underscore, “Inuit society is based on extended family groups. Being in the vicinity of uncles, cousins, second cousins, and so on, has, historically been vital to the functioning of Inuit cultural norms and behaviour” (143–44). While nuclear families were often permitted to stay together during the relocations, this was not always the case. For instance, while Simeonie Amagoalik and the majority of his family were deposited at Resolute, one of his brothers was taken to Grise Fiord (Ryder). Additionally, many relocatees contracted tuberculosis and were then separated from their families and sent to sanatoriums in the South.

40. According to committee member John Amagoalik, “We wanted something that is facing out to the sea, we wanted them to be a man and the other a woman and child. So we gave them those two basic instructions and we just let them do the job” (Amagoalik). The original plan for the Monument Project included two additional sculptures positioned at the relocatees’ original home communities of Pond Inlet and Inukjuak, depicting elders looking out to sea, hoping for the return of their lost kin. Due to a shortage of funds, NTI could only proceed with the Grise Fiord and Resolute sculptures. In September 2011 Makivik Corporation unveiled a sculpture in Inukjuak “designed” by “municipal councillor Siasi Smiler” (Rogers). This monument employs a very different aesthetic than the ones in Resolute and Grise Fiord, being much more ornate and made of bronze with a granite base.

41. One of Pijamini’s well-known sculptural interpretations of the Sedna legend is on permanent display in the Nunavut Legislative Assembly in Iqaluit.

42. Many thanks to Keavy Martin for bringing this point to my attention.

43. Marcus notes that Inuit migration has also been prompted by “famine and scarcity of game” and used as a method of “conflict resolution” in the event of disagreements “between individuals or families” (76). The only known migration story “in which a group of Inuit moved a great distance from one polar region to another” is that of Qitdlarssuaq, a shaman who “committed a murder” and led his family and fifty followers from Broughton Island to Ellesmere Island, where most died of starvation (Marcus, 93).

44. Although James Houston noted a commercial market for somewhat larger pieces, those works still remained quite small, being expanded from typical three-inch carvings to between six to eight inches in total. Fine art collectors, however, responded unfavorably to any increase in size, suggesting that it jeopardized authenticity (Pupchek, 202). Hessel notes that, over more recent decades, Inuit sculptors have experimented with increasing the scale of works in order to create more expensive pieces for commercial sale. However, such larger works have typically still been relatively small, reaching “heights of 60–90 centimetres (two to three feet)” (75). Hessel also observes that “the art market has not been able to absorb an unlimited supply of bigger, more expensive works,” causing “smaller pieces” to still remain the most typical commercial objects (75).

The scale of Inuit sculpture is also reflected in the Inuktitut word for carving. According to George Swinton, “There is no Eskimo word for art” (37). Instead, “the word that is being used for carving [today] is *sananguaq* or *sananuagq*, which has a

significant etymological derivation: *sana* refers to ‘making’ and *nguaq* to the idea of ‘model, imitation, or likeness.’ In Alaska, by the way, *nguaq* refers to ‘play pretending’ and in Greenland it signifies ‘little’ in a sense of a diminutive. Indeed there are several related words which use the suffix *nguaq* to express the diminutive-likeness-imitation-model play connotation [, including] *inunguaq*—doll, ‘a little man-likeness’” (37). It means “a little replica—a little likeness-reality that we have achieved” (38).

45. The carving given to Princess Elizabeth was transported on the *C. D. Howe* (Goetz, 17). James Houston’s art purchasing journeys throughout the central and eastern Arctic “were made by dogsled, airplane and the Eastern Arctic Patrol vessel, *C. D. Howe*” (Graburn 1987, 3).

46. The sculptures at Resolute and Grise Fiord were the largest pieces Amagoalik and Pijamini had created to date. Pijamini has since been employed by Nunavut Tunngavik Incorporated to co-create, along with two other sculptors, a large monument commemorating the twentieth anniversary of the NLCA, which was unveiled in Iqaluit on July 9, 2013 (“Nunavut Celebrates”).

47. According to Marcus, “‘Gris’ means pig in Norwegian, and on some old maps the fiord is labelled ‘Pig Fiord.’ . . . A possible explanation might be found in the Norwegian word ‘grisevaer,’ used to describe ‘piggish’ or rotten weather” (206).

48. Byers also notes that “these Inuktitut names reflect the fact that, historically [at least for a few centuries], the Inuit did not live this far north” (109).

49. Other government relocations of Inuit include the movement of Labrador Inuit living in Nutak in 1956 and in Hebron in 1959 and the Ennadai Lake relocations of the 1950s. Tester and Kulchyski, as well as Marcus, have written extensively about the latter in their books. In 2005 the premier of Newfoundland and Labrador apologized for the Hebron and Nutak relocations and apology monuments have also been created to commemorate these events (“Relocated”).

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